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A cyber process in a distributed system can fabricate its internal state in its com-
munications with its peers. These state fabrications can cause other processes in the
distributed system to make incorrect control decisions. Cyber-physical systems have a
unique advantage in the detection of falsified states because processes typically have ob-
servable effects on a shared physical infrastructure. This physical infrastructure acts as a
high-integrity message channel that broadcasts changes in individual process states. The
objective of this research is to demonstrate that there are cases where physical feedback
from the shared infrastructure can be used to detect state fabrications. To that end,
this work introduces a distributed security mechanism called physical attestation that
detects state fabrications in the future smart grid. Graph theory is used to prove that
physical attestation works in general smart grid topologies, and the theory is supported
with experimental results obtained from a smart grid test bed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system integrates a physical infrastructure with cyber compu-
tation for improved performance and reliability. Most CPSs are distributed systems in
which several cyber processes cooperate to control a set of physical resources. An individ-
ual process cannot directly measure the complete system state, and must communicate
over some network to share information with its peers. It is vital that the processes share
accurate state information with each other to ensure that the distributed system makes
the correct control decisions. Failure in a CPS can result in physical consequences such
as damage to the machines or harm to the humans involved in the system operation.
These consequences can be severe in critical infrastructures such as water distribution,
transportation systems, or the electric power grid.
Consider the case of Stuxnet, which resulted in the wide-spread infection of
Siemens programmable logic controllers [1]. The controllers infected by Stuxnet at-
tempted to damage centrifuges by causing malicious changes to their rotor speeds. At
the same time, Stuxnet sent false state reports which indicated normal rotor speeds back
to human operators. One of Stuxnet’s goals was for the false state information to trick
the operators into making the wrong control decision, namely, keeping the centrifuges
running. Stuxnet was possible because the system was not designed to validate the
physical measurements produced by the infected controller.
Stuxnet is an example of an attack that occurred in an industrial setting where
physical security could have prevented the attack. However, consider a water distribution
system which spans a large geographical area, or a smart house which has a large amount
of human traffic. Most CPSs have physical components located in unprotected, public
environments. CPS security research, in the same vein as wireless sensor networks [2],
should anticipate that parts of the physical infrastructure will be compromised.
2It is difficult to detect compromised processes in a distributed system. In some
cases, such as Stuxnet, the compromised process continues to exhibit expected commu-
nication patterns. Even if a compromise can be detected, it might not be possible to
determine the exact process that has been compromised. However, a CPS has an advan-
tage over a traditional distributed system in that it contains a physical infrastructure.
When a controller makes a control decision, it leaves a physical footprint. The physical
infrastructure serves as a ground truth, rooted in the laws of physics, that constrains
the extent to which cyber processes can lie without being detected.
The goal of this research is to develop a distributed security mechanism called
physical attestation that utilizes both the cyber and the physical aspects of a CPS. Cyber
processes can utilize the physical infrastructure as a high-integrity message channel
to validate the states of their peers. An example smart grid system will be used to
demonstrate the potential of this combined cyber-physical approach to security.
1.1. SMART GRID ARCHITECTURE
An example CPS in which state validation is essential is the future smart grid.
Smart grid often refers to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in which smart
meters are deployed into the existing electric power grid. These smart meters enable
two-way communication between the power utility and their customers. The utility uses
smart meters to receive power consumption data from the grid to improve predictions
about future load. This data allows the utility to make real time control decisions to
improve the performance of the electric power grid. Customers can also receive real
time power pricing data from the utility to make more informed choices about power
consumption. This research, however, will explore a different model of the smart grid in
which consumers participate in power generation through renewable energy resources.
The future smart grid proposes the use of distributed cyber intelligence to manage
energy resources at the residential level. This differs from the current power infrastruc-
ture in that it allows household consumers to participate in power generation, a role
3traditionally reserved for the power utility. The future smart grid architecture con-
sists of the houses in a neighborhood, each with its own local energy production and
consumption, connected by a shared distribution line. Although the distribution line
still connects to the power grid, the cyber intelligences at each house run distributed
algorithms such as energy management independent of the power utility.
Figure 1.1 shows the structure of a neighborhood within this smart grid model.
Each house, or bus, along the distribution line has some local source of generation
and load. Renewable energy resources such as solar and wind provide the generation
at each bus, while household appliances contribute to the load. A house with more
generation than necessary to satisfy its local load is called a supply house, while a house
in need of external generation is called a demand house. One goal in this smart grid
model is for supply houses to provide their excess power to demand houses to reduce
dependence on the power utility. To enable this goal, the houses are connected by









Figure 1.1: Future Smart Grid Architecture
4One distributed algorithm for the smart grid is energy management which makes
control decisions based on the real power injection at each bus [3]. Each bus has an asso-
ciated real power injection value that will be used in the distributed energy management
algorithm. This power value can be calculated for each bus i as:
Pi = Generationi − Loadi (1.1)
The values for Generationi and Loadi come from the local generation and load
at each bus. A negative Pi value indicates that bus i is in demand and acts as a load,
while a positive value indicates the bus has supply and acts as a generator. Each demand
house can draw power from the distribution line to satisfy its excess load. This capability
exists in the current power grid where power flows from a centralized power utility to
the individual houses. Supply houses can push some of their excess generation back into
the distribution line. This capability represents a supply house using its local generation
to satisfy the load at a demand house in its neighborhood.
These pushes and pulls of power are governed by transactions called power mi-
grations that are negotiated between the cyber controllers distributed at each house.
Migration contracts are formed to migrate some quanta of power from the supply house
into the demand house. A power migration is a sequence of an injection of power from a
supply house followed by absorption of power from a demand house. The physical rep-
resentation of this transaction is that a supplier turns on its generator, causing power
to enter the shared distribution line, and then a demand house plugs in some load. This
creates a natural flow of power from the supply house to the demand house. Figure 1.2
illustrates the following steps of a power migration:
1. A supply house advertises its excess generation capacity to the neighborhood
2. Demand houses in the neighborhood request power from the supply house
3. The supply house selects a demand house and forms a migration contract
54. The supply house increases its location generation
5. The demand house increases its local load
Figure 1.2: Power Migration Steps
A power migration resembles a two-phase commit protocol [4] in that both parties
must either perform their respective power changes or abort together. An added diffi-
culty over traditional two-phase commit protocols is that energy management contains
both cyber and physical actions. While Step 2 and Step 3 of the migration protocol
commit the supply and demand houses to the power migration on the communication
layer, they do not guarantee that the corresponding physical actions from Step 4 and
Step 5 occur. If a fault or malicious behavior decoupled the sending of the cyber message
from the physical action, the power migration would fail.
The formal smart grid model has two state variables to account for this decoupling
between the cyber message and the actual state of the physical system. Each bus has
two state variables to represent its real power injection, Pi and Pˆi. Pi is the amount of
6excess generation at bus i as calculated by Equation 1.1, and corresponds to the state of
the bus in the physical system. Pˆi represents the advertised generation of bus i broadcast
to the system during the power migration protocol, and corresponds to the state of the
bus in the cyber system. The distinction between these state variables is that Pi is a
physical value for the actual generation at a bus, whereas Pˆi is a cyber value sent to
other buses over the network. In the case of Stuxnet, Pi would be the actual rotor speed
of the centrifuges while Pˆi would be the value for rotor speed that the infected controller
reported to the human operator. That the value reported by the cyber controller can
be different from the state of the physical system is what enables attacks like Stuxnet.
The buses in the smart grid model are also connected by a shared distribution
line which each bus can measure using its local voltage and phase angle. All real power
changes that occur, whether from the utility or due to a power migration, will affect
each bus’ voltage and phase angle. These local measurements allow a bus to gauge
whether or not there is activity in the physical system. Each bus i has two additional
state variables for voltage Vi and phase angle δi to represent these measurements.
1.2. ATTACK MODEL
The smart meters distributed in the AMI are attractive targets for attackers [5].
Smart grid literature has focused on one specific attack scenario against smart meters
called the false data injection attack [6]. This is a Stuxnet-like attack in which the state
of buses in the power grid is falsified such that it cannot be detected by centralized bad
data detection algorithms [7]. It has been shown that false data injection attacks have
quantifiable adverse effects on the system, such as increased transmission cost of power
and higher outage ratios for households [8]. Although the smart grid model presented
in this research differs from the AMI, it is simple to imagine an extension of the false
data injection attack in the context of power migrations.
Figure 1.3 illustrates a false state attack against power migrations called the fake
demand attack. An attacker compromises a cyber controller associated with one of the
7buses in the smart grid neighborhood. Like Stuxnet, the compromised controller sends
falsified messages over the network which do not correspond to its actual physical state.
In the smart grid model, this attack is equivalent to broadcasting a value of Pˆi where
Pˆi 6= Pi. This allows the attacker, who has no actual load, to pose as a demand node
and convince a supplier to give it power that it cannot utilize. It is easy to imagine
other similar attack scenarios, such as a case where a supplier lies about generation that
it does not have. This work will consider the entire class of false state attacks where Pˆi







Figure 1.3: Fake Demand Attack
The goal of the fake demand attack depends on whether the system is an isolated
micro grid or connected to the wider power grid. If the neighborhood has been isolated
from the grid, then the fake demand attack will lead to an imbalance in generation
and load that will cause undesired frequency changes [9]. If the neighborhood is grid
connected, then the power utility will make up for the difference in generation and
load and the frequency will remain stable. However, the attack will prevent the power
capacity of the supply houses it tricks from reaching demand houses with an actual need.
This will reduce the performance of the power migration algorithm, and can be thought
of as a simple denial of service attack against demand nodes in the smart grid.
8Suppose a supply house tries to detect this attack by using its local measurements
of the shared distribution line to verify the physical behavior of its migration partner.
The problem with Vi and δi as a means for a cyber process to monitor the behavior
of its peers is that the voltage and phase change regardless of where a power change
has happened. Consider Figure 1.4 in which the compromised controller A causes a bad
power migrationBA when it has no local load. There is a change in phase angle δB in this
case, because although controller A has not changed its amount of load, another demand
bus has made a physical change for a separate migrationDC . From the perspective of
the supply house B, it observes activity on the distribution line through a change in its
phase angle δB and cannot assume that it is the victim of an attack. Although each
house has a local measurement it can use to gauge activity on the distribution line, that
measurement is not precise enough to identify the sources of power injections. As long
as a fake demand attack times itself to occur with other power migrations, an easy feat










Figure 1.4: Impact of the Fake Demand Attack
This causes a problem for traditional cyber security mechanisms in distributed
systems. Both authentication and cryptography do nothing to prevent an insider at-
tack from a compromised controller. Security mechanisms such as anomaly detection
and reputation systems depend on the detection of dishonest behavior. Yet from the
9perspective of the cyber system, no attack has occurred, because the cyber behavior of
the compromised controller is consistent with a normal process. The actual attack has
occurred through the decoupling of the cyber and the physical actions so that the cyber
state no longer corresponds to the physical behavior of a process. What is needed is a
means to glue the cyber and physical back together and verify that the reported cyber
state of a process corresponds to its actual physical state.
1.3. NONDEDUCIBILITY
In the previous section, the fake demand attack was said to have been unde-
tectable using the local measurements of a single bus in the system. Nondeducibility is
an information flow property introduced by Sutherland to analyze system security that
can be used to prove this claim [10]. Let a world w be a state of the system. Then define
an information function f1(w) to be all of the high-level events that led to the state w,
and a second function f2(w) to be all of the low-level events. A low-level observation z
is nondeducible if:
(∀w ∈ W )(∃w′ ∈ W : f1(w) = f1(w′) ∧ f2(w′) = z ∧ w 6= w′) (1.2)
Equation 1.2 is satisfied if all possible high-level command sequences f1(w) can
produce the low-level observation z in some world w′. If a single high-level command
sequence cannot produce the observation z, then given z it can be deduced that at least
one command was not issued, and the Sutherland definition is violated. The traditional
use of nondeducibility proves system security by showing that all high-level traces of
the system are nondeducible, and so no low-level observation can be used to identify
what high-level event occurred. However, the definition is not restricted to the notion
of a high and low security domain, and can be extended to encompass any number of
different views of the system [11]. Consider two partitions of the system, one partition
from the viewport of an attacker (f1) and a second partition from the viewport of an
10
arbitrary house in the smart grid (f2). If the attacker is nondeducible with respect to
this arbitrary house, it means that the house cannot determine based on its information
function whether the attack has occurred. Although nondeducibility is often a desirable
property that protects high-level information, in this case a nondeducible system would
hide information about an attacker from its peers. Therefore, it is imperative that the
system be deducible in order to detect the origin of compromised controllers.
1.4. ATTACK ANALYSIS
A lattice of security levels can be defined for the smart grid that segregates the
houses into different security domains. For each bus i in the power grid, a security
level Li exists which represents that bus’ perspective of the physical system. An ad-
ditional system level exists to represent the state knowledge shared by all processes
in the distributed system, which in this case would be the state messages broadcast
over the network. These security levels follow a partial order such that (∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤
n)(system ≤ Li). This allows a bus i to view both its private level Li as well as the
shared system level, but restricts it from viewing its peers’ internal states. Figure 1.5
depicts the security lattice for a system of n nodes.
L1 L2 Ln
system
Figure 1.5: System Security Lattice
State variables are assigned to security levels such that, for each bus i in the
system, Pi ∈ Li and Pˆi ∈ system. Such an assignment has the natural meaning that
the amount of generation at a given node is private data known only to that node, and
the rest of the system must rely on its view of the advertised value Pˆi. This represents
11
the reality of a smart grid where a house is not allowed direct access to their neighbors’
meters. δi ∈ Li follows the same line of reasoning in that voltage phase angle is unique
to each bus, and cannot be read by other buses in the system unless broadcast over the
network.
With this, the complete system state Q composed of n buses is defined as the set
Q = {Pˆ1, . . . , Pˆn, P1, . . . , Pn, δ1, . . . , δn}. A state transition Q→ Q′ occurs when a node
performs a command drawn from a pool of legal system commands. Each command
modifies the original state Q to produce a new state Q′ where state variables in Q′ are
represented by prime notation. A list of system commands for power migrations and
their impact on the system state are presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: State Transition Commands
command description
migrate(i, j)
supplier i forms a migration contract with demand node j
Pˆ ′i ← Pˆi + 1 and Pˆ ′j ← Pˆj − 1
increase(i)
node i increases its local generation by one unit
P ′i = Pi + 1 and ∀x, δ′x = δx + ∆ where ∆ is some change
decrease(i)
node i increases its local load by one unit
P ′i = Pi − 1 and ∀x, δ′x = δx + ∆ where ∆ is some change
Theorem 1. The fake demand attack is nondeducible to the system if the attacker acts
concurrently with another power migration.
Proof. Table 1.2 shows the command sequence and state transitions for the fake demand
attack shown in Figure 1.4. Define the high-level domain as high = LA ∪ LC ∪ LD and
the low-level domain as low = LB ∪ system. This definition of the low-level domain
is consistent with the view of supply house B which is the victim of the attack. If
information flows from high to low, then supplier B would be able to deduce the high-
level commands and thus determine that it has been attacked.
Given the formulation of high and low, the low-level view consists of states with
the form {PˆA, PˆB, PˆC , PˆD, PB, δB}. For the command sequence shown in Table 1.2,
viewlow = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} → {−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0} → {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0, 0}
→ {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0,∆1} → {−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,∆2} → {−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,∆3}
(1.3)
12
Table 1.2: Fake Demand Attack during Another Migration
cmd PˆA PA δA PˆB PB δB PˆC PC δC PˆD PD δD
init 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
migrate(B,A) -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
migrate(D,C) -1 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0
decrease(C) -1 0 ∆1 1 0 ∆1 -1 -1 ∆1 1 0 ∆1
increase(B) -1 0 ∆2 1 1 ∆2 -1 -1 ∆2 1 0 ∆2
increase(D) -1 0 ∆3 1 1 ∆3 -1 -1 ∆3 1 1 ∆3
Consider the first state transition {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} → {−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0} and observe that
none of the commands from Table 1.1 can cause this transition except for migrate(B,A).
It is therefore possible to deduce that this state transition must have been caused by a
power migration formed between a supply house B and a demand house A. However, this
deduction yields no high-level system information, as the migrate command only affects
low-level state variables Pˆi. The same is true of the next migrate(D,C) command
which also operates on only low-level state variables. These two transitions do not help
prove the theorem, but provide good examples of what deducible transitions would look
like.
The first transition which affects high-level state information is the decrease(C)
command which causes {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0, 0} → {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0,∆1}. If this state transi-
tion was dedudcible, then it would be possible to determine which command from the
table caused it in the same manner as the migrate(B,A) command above. It is imme-
diately obvious that a migrate command did not cause the transition, because none of
the Pˆi values have changed. The transition could also not be due to the increase(B)
command, because the fifth state variable for PB does not change. However, with the
definition of high = LA ∪ LC ∪ LD, these are not high-level commands, as they do not
affect variables in the high-level security domain.
There are six possible high-level commands for this transition, the increase(i)
and decrease(i) commands for all i in the set {A,C,D}. From the command table,
all of these commands cause some high-level change to a Pi variable. Yet all of these
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commands result in the same low-level change of δ′B = δB + ∆. Thus, given an ini-
tial state of {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0, 0}, all six commands would lead to the same final state
of {−1, 1,−1, 1, 0,∆1}. This transition is nondeducible since it is possible for all the
high-level commands to be issued and still result in the same low-level trace.
Of the remaining two state transitions, increase(D) is nondeducible for the same
reason as above. While increase(B) is deducible since it causes a low-level state change
to PB, this is not high-level state information. Across all the state transitions, only two
transitions affect high-level information, and both of those transitions are nondeducible.
This makes the entire sequence nondeducible, and from the view of supply house B, it
is impossible to determine which subset of houses have made real power changes during
the events from Table 1.2.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that, if an attacker acts during a power migration be-
tween another pair of houses, the attacker can pose as a demand node without the
system being able to determine its identity. Note that the tight timing suggested by
this interleaving is not as severe as it seems, as although the attacker must align itself
with another power migration, it is difficult to place a causal order between events in a
distributed system. Therefore, even if the attacker responds far after the second power
migration, it is still possible, given communication delays, for the event sequence to
resemble Table 1.2. With this, the fake demand attack has been proven to resemble
Stuxnet in that it can hide itself from the view of the system.
1.5. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this document is organized as follows:
1. Section 2 discusses related work in the field of cyber and physical security.
2. Section 3 presents the theory behind a new distributed security mechanism for
smart grids called physical attestation.
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3. Section 4 describes how physical attestation works in general topologies.
4. Section 5 considers physical attestation in ring, mesh, and hypercube topologies.
5. Section 6 presents preliminary results from an implementation of physical attesta-
tion in a smart grid test bed.





The goal of tamper resistant hardware is to make it difficult to break into the
system. For example, the hardware can be enclosed in a sealed box that requires special
tools to break open. While tamper resistant hardware cannot prevent a compromise from
a persistent attacker, the goal is to raise the cost of the attack. With an increased cost
to attack, a reasonable attacker will no longer find it profitable to attack the system [12].
In addition to tamper resistant hardware, there is also tamper responding and
tamper evident hardware. Tamper responding means that an attack will trigger some
kind of response from the system. For example, a tamper responding car might trigger
an alarm when a burglar attempts to break into it. The goal in this case is not to prevent
the attack, but to make the attack noticable so an external operator can take corrective
measures. Tamper evident means that the attack will leave evidence that can later be
recovered to detect the compromise. For example, a tamper evident envelope might have
a seal that must be broken before its contents can be read. A tamper evident system
makes it easier to apply the other approaches described in this section, as it is easy to
determine if a system has been compromised.
There are processors that provide both tamper evident and tamper resistant
environments [13]. However, most applications choose to use low-cost processors such
as smart cards for improved cost scalability. Research into the effectiveness of tamper
resistance in low-cost processors such as smart cards has shown the existence of many
viable, low-cost attacks [14]. In addition, because most of these processors involve some
form of external communication, software or protocol errors can cause faults that bypass
physical security [15].
Because of the cost and limitations of tamper resistant hardware, an equivalent
notion of tamper resistant software has appeared in research. A self-checking or integrity-
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checking piece of software is able to detect modifications to the program code at runtime.
This is done through the computation of a checksum of the program execution at run-
time, which is compared against original code. If a code modification is detected, the
software calls a tamper response mechanism or repair code that restores the modified re-
gions to their original state. Approaches exist that use both insertion of periodic testers
into the code [16], as well as insertion of guards on program statements [17].
2.2. BAD DATA DETECTION
Bad data detection is a traditional scheme to protect the state estimation algo-
rithms of the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that control
the electric power grid. Its goal is to determine when a subset of meter readings provided
to a centralized state estimation algorithm has been corrupted due to meter faults. The
meter readings identified as bad data can be discarded to prevent them from interfering
with the control of the power grid.
z = Hx+ e (2.1)
Equation 2.1 shows the basis for state estimation in a power system using a
direct current (DC) model for power flow [18]. z = {z1, z2, . . . , zm} is the set of meter
readings collected by the SCADA system, and e = {e1, e2, . . . , em} is the measurement
error allowed for each meter. x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is the real system state, and H is a
vector of functions hi(x) = zi that maps the system state to the meter readings z. This
equation can be solved for x to get the state estimation xˆ based on the known physical
topology H and the set of meter readings z.
r = z −Hxˆ (2.2)
Equation 2.2 shows an example residual function that can be used for bad data
detection [19]. r = {r1, r2, . . . , rm} is a residual that measures the amount of error
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contained in the estimated state xˆ. Each element of the residual will be small unless
the measurements z contain some amount of bad data. The bad data can be identified
by checking against each element if ri > ei for some small error tolerance ei. However,
this protection scheme was devised to protect against meter faults, not malicious attacks
against the state estimation algorithm.
z = Hx+ e+ a = H(x+ c) + e (2.3)
Equation 2.3 shows a false data injection attack against the bad data detection
algorithm [20]. The a term is an attack vector selected by the attacker which is added to
the meter measurements z to inject false data into the system. An intelligent attacker
that knows the system topology H will select an attack vector a = Hc to produce the
equation z = H(x+ c) + e. This causes the state estimator to calculate that the system
is in some state xˆ = x + c other than the actual system state x. Observe that the
reason this attack is successful is because the attack x + c is equivalent to some other
system state x′ = x + c and is therefore nondeducible. Another variant of the false
data injection attack is a topological attack which instead modifies H through injection
of false topological data [21]. This attack would provide false values of switches and
breakers to the state estimation algorithm to produce a state estimate xˆ for the wrong
physical topology.
Whether false data injection is a threat depends on how difficult it is for an
attacker to generate an attack vector a that is consistent with the physical topology.
A polynomial time algorithm has been developed that generates the smallest set of
meters that must be compromised to launch an unobservable false data injection attack
against a given topology [22]. Unobservable in this context means that the attack
vector a is consistent with the physical topology a = Hc and will pass through bad
data detection algorithms without detection. Another polynomial time algorithm can
be used to enumerate all of the low cost unobservable attacks that require 5 or fewer
compromised meters in general graphs [23].
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The trend in literature to prevent unobservable attacks is to utilize a piece of
physical hardware called a phasor measurement unit (PMU). PMUs utilize global posi-
tioning system (GPS) synchronized clocks to produce high fidelity meter readings of the
power system. It has been shown that deployment of PMUs improves bad data detection
against faults due to redundant measurements [24]. It has also been suggested that they
can be useful in protection against malicious attacks by providing trusted measurements
to the state estimation algorithm [25]. The main assumption behind this approach is
that a PMU is tamper resistant, and thus cannot be compromised by an attacker in the
same manner as a smart meter. Research in this direction has explored which buses are
most vulnerable through formulation of security indices that quantify which buses are
most useful in producing unobservable attacks [26]. Redundant measurements can then
be produced for these buses through deployment of PMUs to prevent false data injection
attacks [27].
Besides tamper resistant approaches, several other methods have been proposed
which modify the state estimation algorithms to guard against false data injection. One
distributed approach attempts to estimate the false data injection alongside the system
state and eliminate the attack vector from the state estimation [28]. Another approach
proposes changing the residual from Equation 2.2 to include local measurements of
voltage and phase angle at each bus [29]. Observation of which bus voltages lead to
high error terms during the state estimation process will isolate the location at which
compromises occured during the attack.
2.3. ANOMALY DETECTION
Anomaly detection evaluates the behavior of the nodes in a distributed system
for malicious behavioral profiles. If a node deviates from the expected behavior with
some statistical significance, or violates an established behavioral rule, then it must be
faulty. These two forms of anomaly detection are called profile-based and rule-based
detection.
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In anomaly detection methods, a subject performs an action on a object which
produces an audit record. The actions of all distributed nodes in the system are con-
tained in the same audit record. A real-time system monitors the audit record looking for
subjects that exhibit anomalous behavior. Anomalous behavior is defined as a sequence
of suspicious actions that have been correlated with an attack. When an anomalous
subject is found, the real-time system takes some form of corrective action [30].
A profile-based anomaly detection method first monitors the behavior of all sub-
jects over a trial period. This set of behaviors is used to compute a normal profile for
groups of users that is the expected behavior for a normal process. After the trial period,
behavior that deviates with statistical significance from the normal behavior is flagged
as suspicious. In order to account for changes in the system, the normal profiles must
be periodically updated using data from the audit record [31]. A profile-based method
of anomaly detection can be replaced with a neural network. Instead of a trial period,
the neural network has a training period to adapt to the behavior of the system. Then
during runtime, the neural network can map a subject’s behavior to one of the trained
profiles [32].
As an alternative to profile-based anomaly detection, a rule-based detection
method looks for suspicious actions. An intrusion can be modeled as a sequence of
signature actions that bring an attack from some initial state to a compromised state.
Such an attack can be represented as a series of state transitions, with the transitions
being the signature actions. It is possible to develop a set of rules based on the state
transitions of known attacks that are able to detect specific attack patterns. Given these
attack patterns, the audit record can be parsed for subjects that violate the rules. This
approach is better at guarding against known attacks than the statistical approach, but
cannot detect new attack scenarios [33].
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2.4. SYSTEM LEVEL DIAGNOSIS
System level diagnosis is a method to discover faults in a distributed system by
means of peer evaluation. The system is divided into a set of testable units, which are
the smallest set of components that can exhibit a fault. Each testable unit is assigned
a subset of other units in the system which it is responsible for testing. A test is a
challenge-response protocol where a tester issues a challenge to a peer unit and compares
the response to some expected value. The set of failed tests in the system is used to
determine which units have faults.
The PMC model first introduced the notion of system level diagnosis in litera-
ture [34]. A system is modeled as a directed graph where the testable units are vertices
and the arcs are test results. Each arc has a label of either 0 for a failed test or 1 for
a passed test. The collection of test results is known as a syndrome. There are two
possibilities for diagnosis under the assumption that there is some maximum number
t of faults in the system. Either all t faults can be identified at once using a single
syndrome, or at least one fault can be identified among the t faulted units. These cases
are known as one-step diagnosable and sequentially diagnosable systems respectively. A
main assumption of the PMC model is that each fault is permanent. This means that a
faulted unit will always fail a test issued by a non-faulted unit.
An intermittent fault, or intermittent behavior, permits a fault to either pass
or fail when tested by a non-faulted unit. In a system with intermittent faults, the
evaluation of testable units may be incorrect due to insufficient testing. A fault in
the system can go undetected if the faulted unit exhibits normal behavior during the
testing procedure, but faulty behavior otherwise. To detect faults in a system that allows
intermittent behavior, it is necessary to use repetitive, periodic testing. Even when the
tests are repeated, it is still possible that a faulted unit will result in no failed tests. [35]
A model that considers both permanent and intermittent faults is known as a t/ti-
diagnosable system where t is the maximum number of faults and ti is the maximum
number of intermittent faults. This model is sufficient to represent both the original
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PMC model when ti = 0, and the model that considers only intermittent behavior when
ti = t [36].
2.5. REMOTE ATTESTATION
Remote attestation is a mechanism popular in wireless sensor networks which
detects compromised sensors using random memory walks. The key assumption behind
remote attestation is that faulty behavior leaves some kind of evidence in memory. In
essence, remote attestation is one method to implement the tests described in system
level diagnosis.
Software-based Attestation (SWATT) attests to the memory contents of an em-
bedded device using an external verifier [37]. It is a challenge-response protocol in which
the verifier issues a challenge to a device that instructs it to perform a memory walk.
Meanwhile, the verifier performs the same memory walk as a local computation to pro-
duce the expected result of the test. When the tested device produces its outcome for
the memory walk, it is compared against the expected result to check for faulty behavior.
An assumption is made that an attacker cannot modify the physical hardware of the
devices, such as memory size or CPU speed. This assumption prevents the attacker from
copying the memory contents to external memory for use in the attestation protocol.
Because SWATT is a challenge-response protocol, it is vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks. An attacker can intercept the challenge and response to manipulate the
outcome of the test results. A better solution is for each device to produce periodic
reports that are sent to a verifier without the need for an initial challenge. The synchro-
nized system time can be used as the seed for random number generation in place of a
challenge. This protocol, called One-Way Memory Attestation (OMAP), makes remote
attestation a more reliable security mechanism. [38]
The SWATT approach also has poor scalability, since a verifier must perform
local computation to verify each device. Another revised protocol called Smart Meter
Attestation (SMATT) reduces the computational strain by eliminating the need for
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the verifier to compute an expect result. Instead, the verifier issues a large number of
identical, simultaneous challenges to a group of homogenous devices in the system. [39]
Because the devices are homogenous, each device should produce the same result in
response to the challenge. Therefore, the challenges from each device are compared
against each other and responses that differ from the majority are considered malicious.
This approach eliminates the need for a verifier to perform a memory walk for each
device that must be tested in the system.
A final issue with the SWATT approach is that there may not be a trusted verifier
available for each device in the system. In this case, remote attestation can be performed
using a cluster of devices as a distributed verifier. Each node in the cluster performs
one of the attestation protocols described above independently. A majority vote is then
taken between the cluster nodes to determine whether the device passes or fails the test.
While other approaches exist to perform distributed attestation, this is the simplest
implementation in literature [40].
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3. PHYSICAL ATTESTATION
This work proposes a distributed security mechanism for the smart grid called
physical attestation. In physical attestation, a verifier validates the measurements pro-
duced by a cyber process against the physics of the physical system. Physical attestation
is based on the observation that changes in cyber process state cause physical side effects
due to the tight coupling between the cyber and physical layers. Prior literature has
shown that there are cases where it is possible to deduce the current state of the cyber
system by monitoring these physical side effects [41]. The physical infrastructure can be
considered a high-integrity message channel that contains a portion of the cyber process
state. A verifier can check if a cyber state is consistent with the physical infrastructure
to determine whether or not the state has been falsified.
An overview of physical attestation is shown in Figure 3.1. During attestation, a
verifier validates the cyber behavior of some target process using a subset of the physical
system state. Physical measurements are collected from several processes that neighbor
the target in the physical topology to have sufficient observability of the physical system.
These measurements are then fed into a physical attestation algorithm which compares
the measurements against the topology of the smart grid. Whether or not a target passes
attestation depends on whether the measurements used in the verification algorithm are
consistent with the physical topology. This section will provide insight on how the
physical attestation algorithm is able to detect malicious cyber behavior.
3.1. PHYSICAL INVARIANTS
An invariant is a logical assertion that must remain true during system execution.
For a physical system such as the electric power grid, invariants are physical laws that
must hold due to the physics of the system. Physical attestation uses a set of physical











Figure 3.1: Physical Attestation Overview
surements received from the target and its peers are used to instantiate the physical
invariants and determine whether the invariants evaluate to true. The theory behind
this invariant approach is that a physical law cannot be violated by the physical system.
If a physical invariant evaluates to false, then it must be because it was instantiated
with bad measurements from a malicious cyber controller.
Within the smart grid, conservation of power can be used as one such physical
invariant. In Figure 3.2, for instance, the invariant Ib must hold at bus b that:
{Ib : |Pab + Pˆb − Pbc| ≤ } (3.1)
Pij in Equation 3.1 refers to the real power flow between buses i and j on the
distribution line while Pˆi refers to the real power injection value reported by the cyber
controller at bus i. Recall that this real power injection value differs from the value
in Equation 1.1 because Pˆi is a cyber state that can be falsified by a compromised
controller. The  is a small error term to account for measurement error in the physical
measurements.
Because the cyber controllers are located at each bus and not each distribution





Figure 3.2: Conservation of Power
the line power flows must be calculated using measurements produced by the pair of







[Rij{Vˆi − Vˆjcos(δˆi − δˆj)}+XijVˆjsin(δˆi − δˆj)] (3.2)
An assumption is made that each bus has a means to measure its local voltage
Vˆi and phase angle δˆi such that Equation 3.2 can be instantiated to calculate the dis-
tribution line powers for the invariant. A hat notation is used for both of these values
because, like the real power injection Pˆi, a compromised cyber controller can falsify its
reported voltage and phase angle. It is also assumed that each cyber controller knows
the topology of the physical system, which includes the distribution line resistance Rij
and reactance Xij. Then each bus i will provide its real power injection Pˆi for use in
power migrations, and its voltage Vˆi and phase angle δˆi to instantiate Equation 3.2.
3.2. INVARIANT VIOLATION PATTERNS
When a cyber controller feeds falsified values into the system, it will violate a
subset of physical invariants. The existence of a violated invariant is enough to deduce
the existence of a compromised controller, as a physical invariant can only be violated if
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instantiated with false cyber states. However, one violated invariant may not be enough
to deduce which controller has been compromised, due to the existence of multiple
nondeducible cases. This section introduces the notion of invariant violation patterns,
and enumerates the conditions that lead to nondeducible violation patterns that hide
the identify of the compromised controller.
The electric power grid will be modeled as an undirected graph to simplify rea-
soning about physical attestation. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected, simple graph where
the vertices V are buses and the edges E are distribution lines in the physical system.
In order to generate a simple graph, parallel distribution lines in the physical system
are combined and represented as a single edge in the undirected graph. Each vertex, or
bus, has an associated cyber controller that measures its real power injection, voltage,
and phase angle. Each vertex also has an associated conservation of power invariant as
defined in Equation 3.1. For convenience, Definition 1 defines a function µ() that maps
a set of vertices into the set of invariants located at those vertices. From this definition,
µ({1, 3, 4}) = {I1, I3, I4} refers to the set of invariants located at vertices with the labels
1, 3, and 4.
Definition 1. Ix ∈ µ(S) if and only if x ⊆ S.
Within the system model, each controller can falsify three potential values: Pˆi,
Vˆi, and δˆi. However, the voltage and phase angle have the same effect on the invariant as
both are used to compute the line power flows in Equation 3.2. It is therefore sufficient
to consider all possible permutations of both Pˆi and Vˆi to represent a compromised
controller’s full ability to attack the system. If an attacker a falsifies state information,
then Table 3.1 shows the effect of the attack on the physical invariants. Each attack
scenario leads to a specific invariant violation pattern that includes a subset of the
compromised controller a and its neighbor set N(a). The neighbor set in this context
refers to the buses adjacent to a over the distribution line in the electric power grid.
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Table 3.1: Invariant Violation Patterns for a Single Attacker




When an attacker a falsifies its Pˆa value, it only affects the invariant µ({a}) = Ia
because its real power injection is not required to compute the conservation of power at
any other vertex in the graph. However, a falsified Vˆa value is required to compute the
line power flows from Equation 3.2 at each neighbor in N(a). These incorrect line flows
will then be used in invariants at all of the attacker’s neighbors leading to the invariant
violations µ(N(a)). An important note is that an attacker cannot violate a proper subset
of N(a) unless it provides several different values for Vˆa. Since physical attestation has
the attacker report Vˆa once to a single verifier process, it will always violate the full set
µ(N(a)) of invariants. If a controller falsifies both Pˆa and Vˆa, then it can compensate for
the incorrect line flows at its own invariant to prevent itself from being violated. This
set of observations leads to the violation patterns shown in Table 3.1.
From the set of invariant violation patterns, all nondeducible attacks in the sys-
tem can be derived. The following discussion will enumerate all possible nondeducible
cases for the three attack scenarios in Table 3.1. Throughout the discussion, the same
notation as in Table 3.1 will be used to refer to the attack scenarios. Therefore, Pˆa refers
to an attack in which vertex a falsifies its advertised real power injection value, while Vˆa
refers to a falsifying its bus voltage or phase angle.
Lemma 1. The false state attack Pˆa is nondeducible if and only if there exists some
vertex x where N(x) = {a}.
Proof. The attack Pˆa has the violation pattern µ({a}) according to Table 3.1. If Pˆa is
nondeducible, then by definition there must exist some other event in the system that
causes the same violation pattern of µ({a}) = Ia. Because physical invariants are not
violated during normal system operation, this nondeducible event must be an attack
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scenario caused by some vertex x. For any vertex x in the system, both Pˆx and Vˆx
would include a violation at Ix. And because Ix /∈ µ({a}), neither these attack can be
nondeducible with Pˆa. Therefore, Pˆa must be nondeducible with the only remaining
attack scenario of PˆxVˆx. It follows that the PˆxVˆx violation pattern µ(N(x)) must be
equivalent to µ({a}), which yields the desired result of N(x) = {a}.
The sufficient proof is obvious from this result. If N(x) = {a}, then PˆxVˆx yields
the violation pattern µ({a}) which is nondeducible with Pˆa.
Lemma 2. The false state attack PˆaVˆa is nondeducible if and only if there exists some
vertex x where either N(a) = {x} or N(a) = N(x).
Proof. The attack PˆaVˆa has a violation pattern of µ(N(a)). In the same manner as
the proof for Lemma 1, if PˆaVˆa is nondeducible, then there must be another attack
by some vertex x that produces the same violation pattern. The attack Pˆx would be
nondeducible by Lemma 1 if N(a) = {x}. It is also trivial to see that PˆxVˆx will be
nondeducible when N(a) = N(x). The last remaining attack scenario is Vˆx. Assume
that Vˆx is nondeducible with PˆaVˆa in some topology. Then it must hold that these attacks
have the same violation patterns, or that µ({x} ∪N(x)) = µ(N(a)). For this to hold, it
must follow that x ∈ N(a). And because the graph is undirected, x ∈ N(a)→ a ∈ N(x).
Given that a ∈ N(x) and N(x) ⊆ N(a), it must follow that a ∈ N(a). However, this
is impossible because the graph is simple. From this contradiction, Vˆx cannot be a
nondeducible scenario. Thus, if PˆaVˆa is nondeducible, it must be nondeducible with one
of the first two scenarios, which requires either N(a) = {x} or N(a) = N(x).
The sufficient proof is once again obvious. If N(a) = x, then Pˆx is the nonde-
ducible scenario. If N(a) = N(x), then PˆxVˆx is the nondeducible scenario.
Lemma 3. The false state attack Vˆa is nondeducible if and only if there exists some
vertex x where {x} ∪N(x) = {a} ∪N(a).
Proof. The attack Vˆa has the violation pattern µ({a} ∪N(a)). The proofs for Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 have already shown that Vˆa is deducible with both Pˆx and PˆxVˆx. Therefore,
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if Vˆa is nondeducible, then it must be nondeducible with the attack Vˆx. For this to be
true, it must follow that the invariant violation patterns are equivalent and µ({x} ∪
N(x)) = µ({a}∪N(a)). This leads to the desired result of {x}∪N(x) = {a}∪N(a).
Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 list the conditions under which all three at-
tacks from Table 3.1 are nondeducible. There are no other possible attack scenarios in
the system model that involve falsified states as this table contains all possible permu-
tations of the three system states. Therefore, if it can be guaranteed that none of the
conditions for these three lemma hold, all false state attacks against the system would be
deducible. This means that there would be a one-to-one mapping between the invariant
violation patterns and the specific attack scenario that caused them. Physical attesta-
tion utilizes this result to determine whether a target has been malicious by looking for
its unique invariant violation pattern.
3.3. DEDUCIBLE TOPOLOGIES
The three lemma from the previous section provide a means to determine if a
given topology is nondeducible with respect to false state attacks involving a single
compromised controller. If any of the equalities in the lemma are true, then there is at
least one nondeducible false state attack possible in the system topology. However, if
none of the equalities hold, then all of the attack scenarios from Table 3.1 are deducible
and can be detected from their unique invariant violation patterns. This observation
leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. A graph G = (V,E) is deducible with respect to a one-node false state
attack if and only if the conditions hold that:
1. µ(V ) are invariants
2. ∀x, y ∈ V,N(x) 6= {y}
3. ∀x, y ∈ V,N(y)− {x} 6= N(x)− {y}
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Proof. Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3. The
first condition states the assumption of the system model that there is a conservation
of power invariant at each bus in the physical system. The final condition N(y) −
{x} 6= N(x) − {y} is the combination of both N(y) 6= N(x) and {x} ∪ N(x) 6= {y} ∪
N(y) into a single statement under the assumption that the graph is simple. Thus, the
conditions in the theorem are the conditions in all three lemmas negated to prevent
their respective nondeducible attacks. As these three lemma describe all possible one-
node false state attacks, these conditions guarantee the absence of nondeducible attacks
within the graph.
Figure 3.3 shows the two topological features that violate Theorem 2. In the first
case, x has a degree of 1 with N(x) = y and the second condition of the theorem is
violated. This case is nondeducible because there are not enough observation points on
x to determine when it has been compromised. A compromised x can implicate y as an
attacker, and no one can arbitrate the case because y is the only vertex adjacent to x.
The second case, which violates the third theorem condition, shows two vertices x and y
with the same neighbor set and an optional edge between x and y themselves. Whether
x or y is compromised, the same set of neighbors have invariant violations and be unable
to distinguish the source of the compromise. At least one vertex must be connected to
either x or y, but not both, to serve as a tie breaker and determine the source of the
compromise.
x y x y
Figure 3.3: Nondeducible Topological Features
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If Theorem 2 holds and there are sufficient observation points to detect all of
the invariant violations, a compromised controller can be identified by its invariant
violation pattern. Consider the physical network shown in Figure 3.4. Through repeated
application of the results from Table 3.1 to each of the labeled buses, the set of invariant
violations for all possible attacks are presented in Table 3.2. The invariants located
below N1 and N5 are not evaluated because neither N0 nor N6 exist to provide the
voltage and phase angles required to evaluate these invariants. Note that this violates
the first condition of Theorem 3.4 in that some of the invariants cannot be evaluated.
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
a b cx x
Figure 3.4: Simple 5-Node Topology
Table 3.2: 5-Node Invariant Violations






















The invariant violation patterns from Table 3.2 are not unique. Ia can be violated
by both N1 and N2, Ic can be violated by both N4 and N5, and Ib can be violated by
N2, N3, and N4. Observe, however, that the violation pattern for Vˆ1 does not match the
expected results for the behavior of a single compromised controller. This is because two
of the invariants that should have been violated fall outside of the observable region of
the network. The existence of these border invariants that cannot be evaluated allows for
the existence of nondeducible violation patterns. If all of the invariants are calculated,
using measurements from all buses in the system, Theorem 2 would be satisfied and
there would be no nondeducible cases. However, for a distributed security mechanism
such as physical attestation, it is infeasible for one controller to communicate with all
of its potentially thousands of peers in the system. Instead, the observability region will
be extended by increasing the number of nodes until there are enough observations to
generate unique violation patterns for a subset of the controllers.
Figure 3.5 increases the physical network to 7-nodes to extend the observability
region of invariant violations. Table 3.3 lists the invariant violation patterns for this
physical network. The same problem as the 5-node network exists for the border buses
with regards to non-unique violation patterns. For instance, It−2 can still be violated
by both nodes t − 3 and t − 2. However, node t has a unique violation pattern. No
other node violates the combination of invariants It, It−1ItIt+1, or It−1It+1. This means
the 7-node physical network can attest to behavior of node t in the presence of one
compromised controller. If the violation patterns match node t, then it is certain that
node t is the attacker. Otherwise, it is certain that node t is honest.
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
It-2 It-1 It It+1 It+2
Figure 3.5: Simple 7-Node Topology
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Table 3.3: 7-Node Invariant Violations





























Table 3.3 cannot be used to detect if nodes other than t are dishonest. Given the
invariant violation pattern It−2, it is not clear whether node t−3 or t−2 contributed the
falsified states that led to the invariant violations. It is therefore necessary to instantiate
a different subset of physical invariants dependent on the target of attestation. For
example, if the attestation protocol needed to validate the behavior of node t+ 1, then
it would shift Table 3.3 one bus to the right and consider observations produced by node
t + 4. One of the main functions of physical attestation is determining which subset
of invariants is sufficient to perform attestation without any nondeducible cases. This




If a topology satisfies the requirements in Theorem 2, it is guaranteed that there
is no single node nondeducible attack in the system. Therefore, the invariant violation
pattern maps to a unique attacker when a false state attack occurs. However, this
requires measurements from every vertex to be used during the verification process, and
does not scale to large systems. Instead, a subset of vertices will be used to perform the
verification process, and this subset will be called an attestation framework.
When a subset S ⊆ V of vertices are selected for the attestation framework, it
will only be possible to evaluate a subset of the invariants. Definition 2 defines another
function µS(V ) that selects the subset of invariants from µ(V ) that can be instantiated
using measurements from S. From Equation 3.1, an invariant located at a specific vertex
cannot be evaluated without measurements from it and all of its neighbors. This leads
to the requirements from the definition that both x ∈ S and N(x) ⊂ S must hold for
the invariant Ix to be evaluated.
Definition 2. Ix ∈ µS(V ) if and only if x ∈ V , x ∈ S, and N(x) ⊂ S.
Definition 3. A subset of vertices S forms an attestation framework for some vertex t
if and only if t cannot perform a nondeducible attack using the invariants from the set
µS(V ).
Definition 3 implies that the nodes in S will perform a distributed computation to
compute a set of invariants using their local measurements. These invariants will then be
used to determine if the target t of attestation has performed a false state attack against
the system. Because the attestation framework is built around a specific target, each
node in the distributed system would have its own associated attestation framework.
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4.1. DEDUCIBLE FRAMEWORKS
With the definition of the set of invariants µS(V ) and the specific node t, the
conditions from Theorem 2 can be changed to consider nondeducibility within a specific
attestation framework. First, it is no longer necessary to consider all pair wise combi-
nations of vertices in the system given a specific target t. Now it is sufficient to consider
only the cases where either x = t or y = t from the conditions of Theorem 2. Second, the
invariants outside of µS(V ) cannot be evaluated within a given attestation framework,
so all the conditions must be restricted to this specific set. These restrictions lead to
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. A subset of vertices S in a graph G = (V,E) forms an attestation frame-
work for some vertex t if and only if the conditions hold that:
1. It ∈ µS(V )
2. |µS(N(t))| ≥ 2
3. ∀x ∈ N(t) : |µS(N(x))| ≥ 2
4. ∀x ∈ V : µS(N(x)− {t}) 6= µS(N(t)− {x})
Necessary. Suppose the subset of vertices S forms an attestation framework for t. This
proof will show that the removal of any one condition from Theorem 3 enables t to
perform a nondeducible attack. The existence of this nondeducible attack would violate
Definition 3 and contradict that S is a valid attestation framework.
If the first condition does not hold, then It /∈ µS(V ) and the invariant violation
pattern for the attack Pt yields a violation pattern of ∅. However, ∅ is consistent with
the normal operating behavior of the system in the absence of a false state attack, and
thus this attack is nondeducible.
If the second condition does not hold, then |µS(N(t))| must equal either 0 or 1.
Suppose |µS(N(t))| = 0, then when t performs a PtVt attack it results in a violation
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pattern of ∅ which is again nondeducible. Suppose µS(N(t)) = Ix, then when t performs
the same PtVt attack it yields a violation pattern of Ix which is nondeducible with Px.
If the third condition does not hold, then |µS(N(x))| must equal either 0 or 1 for
all x ∈ N(t). However, x ∈ N(t) combined with It ∈ µS(V ) lead to µS(N(x)) = It as
the only case that can violate this condition. And for this case both Pt and PxVx yield
the same violation pattern of It and are thus nondeducible.
If the fourth condition does not hold, then it is trivial to see that either PxVx and
PtVt or Vx and Vt are nondeducible. Which of these leads to the nondeducible case will
depend on whether or not x and t are adjacent.
Sufficient. Suppose the four conditions from Theorem 3 are satisfied for some subset of
vertices S. This proof will show that these conditions lead to t being unable to perform
a nondeducible attack using invariants from µS(V ). Then Definition 3 leads to the result
that S must be an attestation framework for t.
Let t perform the Pt attack with a violation pattern of It where It ∈ µS(V ) by
condition 1 of the theorem. If this attack were nondeducible, then there must exist
an x ∈ N(t) with a violation pattern of µs(N(x)) = It. However, this would require
|µs(N(x))| = 1 which violates condition 3, and no such x can exist.
Let t perform the Vt attack with a violation pattern of µ({t} ∪ N(t)). This
violation pattern within the subset of vertices S is equivalent to It ∪ µS(N(t)). If this
attack were nondeducible, then the violation must be due to an x ∈ N(t) that can violate
the It invariant. From condition 4, there must be some vertex y where Iy ∈ µS(V ) and
either y ∈ N(t) or y ∈ N(x), but not both. Iy serves as an indicator that is violated
only when its adjacent vertex performs an attack, and its existence makes the attack
deducible.
Let t perform the PtVt attack with a violation pattern of µ(N(t)). Suppose this
attack is nondeducible with some x ∈ N(t). Condition 2 requires that the PtVt attack
violate at least two invariants. As a result, x cannot perform the Px attack which would
violate the single invariant Ix. However, all remaining attacks by x would violate It ∈
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µS(N(x)), and It /∈ µ(N(t)) gives a contradiction. Suppose this attack is nondeducible
with some x ∈ V − N(t). Then because x and t are not adjacent, N(t) = N(t) − {x}
and N(x) = N(x) − {t}. Condition 4 gives µS(N(x) − {t}) 6= µS(N(t) − {x}), which
after substitution becomes µS(N(x)) 6= µS(N(t)). Therefore, x cannot perform either
Vx or PxVx as nondeducible attacks, nor the Px attack as shown in the previous case. As
these are all possible attack scenarios, x is deducible with t giving a contradiction.
Theorem 4. If Theorem 2 holds for a graph G = (V,E), then the set of all vertices
within 4-hops of some vertex t ∈ V forms a valid attestation framework for t.
Proof. Let S = {t} ∪ h1 ∪ h2 ∪ h3 ∪ h4 be the set of vertices within 4-hops of t where hi
contains all the ith-hop vertices. It is sufficient to show that the set S satisfies Theorem 3
to prove that S forms a valid attestation framework. From Definition 2, it follows that
µ({t}∪h1∪h2∪h3) ⊆ µS(V ) are all framework invariants. Therefore, the first condition
of Theorem 3 that It ∈ µS(V ) is satisfied.
The condition ∀x, y ∈ V,N(x) 6= {y} from Theorem 2 implies that |N(t)| ≥ 2.
The set N(t) is also the set of 1-hop vertices from t giving the equality N(t) = h1.
And all members of h1 have associated invariants in µS(V ) as derived above, which is
equivalent to the statement |µS(h1)| = |h1|. After substitution of these three results,
the second condition of Theorem 3 is satisfied that |µS(N(t))| ≥ 2.
The condition ∀x, y ∈ V,N(x) 6= {y} also implies that ∀x ∈ N(t), |N(x)| ≥ 2. If
x ∈ N(t) = h1, then all members of N(x) must come from either {t} or the set h2. From
the derivation of µS(V ), the set N(x) ⊆ {t}∪h2 are all invariants within the framework
and |N(x)| = |µS(N(x))|. Substitution back into the first inequality then yields the
third condition of Theorem 3 that ∀x ∈ N(t) : |µS(N(x))| ≥ 2.
For the final condition, suppose some vertex x exists such that the condition isn’t
satisfied and µS(N(x)− {t}) = µS(N(t)− {x}). |µS(N(t))| ≥ 2 has been shown during
the course of this proof, which implies both |µS(N(t)−{x})| ≥ 1 and µS(N(t)−{x}) 6= ∅.
This result, combined with the original assumption, requires that x and t must have at
least one common neighbor. And for x and t to have a common neighbor, it must hold
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that either x ∈ h1 or x ∈ h2. However, this means that all members in N(x) belong to
{t}∪h1∪h2∪h3 and must be invariants within the framework. Therefore, the framework
invariants associated with N(t) are the same as the invariants outside of the framework
and µ(N(x) − {t}) = µ(N(t) − {x}). Definition 1 combined with this equality leads
to N(x) − {t} = N(t) − {x} and violates Theorem 2. From this violation, no such
vertex x can exist that violates the final condition, and all conditions of Theorem 3 are
satisfied.
Given a random graph that satisfies the topological requirements of Theorem 2, a
framework can always be constructed to perform attestation. However, this framework
requires a large number of vertices that may not be necessary to perform the actual
verification, and will not scale to topologies with high connectivity. A more scalable
approach is to minimize the size of the attestation framework to reduce the number of
processes that would need to be included in the distributed computation.
4.2. MINIMUM FRAMEWORKS
The minimum attestation framework problem consists of a graph G = (V,E)
with a distinguished vertex t ∈ V , and a positive integer f ≤ |V |. The problem asks:
does there exist an attestation framework for t in G with size at most f? An attes-
tation framework consists of a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V that satisfies the topological
requirements stated in Theorem 3. This section will prove that the minimum attestation
framework problem is NP-Complete using a reduction from set cover.
An instance of the set cover problem consists of a collection C of subsets of a finite
set S, and a positive integer k ≤ |C|. The problem asks: does there exist a subfamily
C ′ ⊆ C where |C ′| ≤ k and each element of S belongs to at least one member of C ′?
The set cover problem has a polynomial time solution only for the special case when
each set in C has at most two elements.
A polynomial time reduction will transform a set cover instance into a graph G
for the minimum attestation framework problem. First, a vertex is created for each set
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Ci ∈ C and each element s ∈ S. An edge exists between the pair of vertices (Ci, s) if
s ∈ Ci in the set cover instance. Then a cycle of 5 new vertices is created that contains
the distinguished vertex t. Additional edges are created between t and each element
s ∈ S. Given this graph, the value for f is then defined as f = k+ |S|+ 5 where k is the
positive integer from the set cover instance. Because each step of this reduction takes
either O(1), O(|S|), or O(|C||S|) time, it is a polynomial time reduction.
As an example, consider the set cover instance with S = {a, b, c} and C =
{{a, b}, {a, b, c}, {b, c}}. This instance results in the graph shown in Figure 4.1 after











Figure 4.1: Example Reduction from Set Cover
Theorem 5. There exists an attestation framework for t in G = (V,E) with size ≤ f
if and only if there exists a set cover C ′ ⊆ C over S with |C ′| ≤ k.
Necessary Proof. Suppose there is an attestation framework for t in G = (V,E) with
size ≤ f . Two lemmas will be used to prove the necessary condition of Theorem 5.
Lemma 4. The vertices from C with associated invariants in µS(V ) form a set cover
of S.
The third condition from Theorem 3 requires that each vertex in N(t) be adjacent
to two vertices with associated invariants in µS(V ). From the construction of G, it holds
that S ⊂ N(t) for all instances of the set cover problem and thus all vertices in S must
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satisfy this requirement. One of the two vertices will be the target of attestation t since
all members of S are adjacent to t and It ∈ µS(V ) is guaranteed by the first condition
of Theorem 3. From the construction of graph G, the set {w, x, y, z} ∪ S forms an
independent set where {w, x, y, z} are the vertices in the 5-cycle with t. The second of
the two vertices cannot belong to {w, x, y, z} or S due to the existence of this independent
set. Therefore, the second vertex must come from the set V − S − {w, x, y, z, t} = C.
Because this requirement must be met by all s ∈ S, it follows that each s must be
adjacent to some Ci ∈ C where ICi ∈ µS(V ).
Lemma 5. The number of vertices that correspond to members of C in the framework
is at most k.
Theorem 3 requires that an attestation framework contain the set N(t) in order
to evaluate the invariant It. Because S ⊂ N(t), it follows that these |S| nodes must be
part of the framework. Now consider the cycle {w, x, z, y, t} in Figure 4.1. This cycle
will exist in G regardless of the set cover instance that was used in the reduction. For the
same reason as above, {x, z} ⊂ N(t) and both vertices must belong to the framework.
These two vertices must also be adjacent to a second invariant other than It for the
framework to be valid. This second invariant must be Iw for x and Iy for z, as both
vertices have degree two with their other neighbor being the unusable vertex t. The last
vertex in the cycle, t, must be part of the framework since it is the target of attestation.
Thus, all vertices in the 5-cycle must belong to the attestation framework.
When these two results are combined, the framework must consist of |S| vertices
from S and 5 vertices from the cycle. Because the framework has size at most f =
k + |S| + 5, there are at most k additional vertices left in the framework. In addition,
no vertices from C have been added to the framework as C is disjoint from both the set
S and {w, x, y, z, t}. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
The necessary condition is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5: there
are at most k members of C in the attestation framework, and these members form a
set cover of S.
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Sufficient Proof. Suppose there is a set cover C ′ ⊆ C over S with |C ′| ≤ k. From the
graph G, take the subset of vertices that consists of the solution C ′ to set cover, the
vertices in S, and the vertices in the 5-cycle that contains t. This subset has size at
most f = k + |S| + 5 which is the desired size of the attestation framework. All that
remains is to prove that this subset of vertices forms an attestation framework.
According to Theorem 3, an attestation framework must include an invariant at
t. This requires that both t and N(t) be in the framework. For all instances of the set
cover problem, N(t) consists of S and two members of the 5-cycle which are included in
the subset described above. Because t also belongs to the 5-cycle, it is also included in
the subset, and this condition of the theorem is satisfied.
The next condition is that there are two invariants from the set of nodes N(t).
These two invariants are the vertices {x, z} that are adjacent to t in the 5-cycle. Because
the neighbors of these two vertices are members of the cycle, and all members of the cycle
are included in the subset described above, the invariants µS({x, z}) can be instantiated.
This satisfies the second condition of the theorem.
An attestation framework must also include two invariants adjacent to each neigh-
bor of the target t. As It can be used as one of these invariants, this requirement is
satisfied by finding a set of vertices with invariants excluding t that form a set cover
of N(t). The vertices that must be covered are the elements of S and the two vertices
{x, z} from the 5-cycle. The solution to the set cover problem C ′ forms a set cover of S.
Each of the vertices in the set cover solution C ′ can also be evaluated as an invariant
because their neighbors must come from the set S which belongs to the subset described
above. The set {w, z} covers the remaining vertices {x, z} and are also both invariants
since their only neighbors are members of the 5-cycle, all of which belong to the subset
described above. This satisfies the third requirement of the theorem.
The last requirement is that no other vertices in the graph are adjacent to the
same set of invariants as t. This requirement is trivial through the observation that both
Ix and Iz are invariants and {x, z} ⊂ N(t). Through observation of Figure 4.1, no other
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vertices are adjacent to both x and z, and thus these two vertices will always fulfill the
final requirement of Theorem 3.
As each requirement of Theorem 3 has been satisfied with the subset of size ≤ f
described above, this subset is an attestation framework and the sufficient condition has
been proved.
With Theorem 5 proven, and a polynomial time reduction from all instances of set
cover, it has been shown that the minimum attestation framework problem is NP-Hard.
And because each of the conditions from Theorem 3 can be verified in polynomial time,
the minimum attestation problem is also NP-Complete. From this result, it follows that
either an approximation algorithm or special cases must be used in order to generate
minimum attestation frameworks.
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5. PHYSICAL ATTESTATION IN REGULAR NETWORKS
This section examines several regular networks and shows that, although finding a
minimum framework is NP-Hard in the general case, it is quite feasible to find minimum
size frameworks for specific network topologies that exhibit regular connectivity.
5.1. RING NETWORKS
This section will derive the minimum size attestation framework for all ring net-
works. A ring network is a connected topology in which all vertices have a degree of 2.
For a large ring with number of vertices n ≥ 7 it will be shown that the minimum size
attestation framework always has a size of f = 7. However, this section will also prove
the individual cases for rings with size n < 7.
Lemma 6. All ring networks with size n ≤ 4 are nondeducible with respect to the false
state attack and thus cannot be used together with physical attestation.
Proof. It will be shown that all ring networks that satisfy n ≤ 4 violate the third
condition of Theorem 2, which states that ∀x, y ∈ V,N(y) − {x} 6= N(x) − {y}. This
will be done through showing the existence of a pair of vertices in the graph for which
N(y) − {x} = N(x) − {y}. The existence of this counter example is enough to show
that Theorem 1 does not apply and the topology is nondeducible with respect to the
false state attack.
Consider vertices x and y in the ring network with n = 2 in Figure 5.1. For these
vertices, N(x) = {y} and N(y) = {x}. When substituted into the conditional above,
these two sets lead to {x} − {x} = {y} − {y} = ∅. This completes the counter example
which violates the second condition of Theorem 1, and completes the proof for n = 2.
Consider the vertices x and y for the network with n = 3 in Figure 5.1. N(x) =









Figure 5.1: Nondeducible Ring Topologies
{y} = {z}. Once again, the successful production of a counter example to Theorem 1
completes the proof.
Consider the vertices x and y for the network with n = 4. N(x) = N(y) = {w, z}.
After substitution, it still holds that both N(y)− {x} = N(x)− {y} = {w, z}, and this
counter example completes the proof for n = 4.
Lemma 7. All ring networks with size 5 ≤ n ≤ 7 have minimum attestation frameworks
of size n.
Proof. For this proof, an attestation framework will be built around a single target
vertex until it satisfies all of the requirements from Theorem 2. It will be shown that
this framework requires all n vertices or Theorem 2 will not be satisfied. Due to the
unique properties of ring networks, all rings of the same size are homomorphic to each
other. Therefore, the minimum framework for one target vertex in the ring can be
transformed into the minimum framework for any other vertex by relabeling the nodes
in the attestation framework.
For the ring network with n = 5 in Figure 5.2, let a be the target of attestation.
From Theorem 2, it follows that an invariant must be evaluated at the target a. This
requires measurements from the vertices in the set {a, b, c} to instantiate the required
line power flows Pab and Pac. In addition, there must also be invariants at two neighbors
of a to satisfy the second condition of Theorem 2. As b and c are the only possible
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neighbors of a, both must be invariants, which require measurements from the vertices
{a, b, d} and {a, c, e} respectively. Already, the attestation framework must include all
5 vertices to satisfy Theorem 2 and the minimum framework size for n = 5 is n.











Figure 5.2: Deducible Ring Topologies
Now extend the ring network to n = 6 with the addition of the vertex f in
Figure 5.2. With a as the target, it still follows that {a, b, c, d, e} must be included in the
framework for the same reasoning as above. However, the third condition of Theorem 2
states that the neighbors of the target, b and c, must be adjacent to two invariants. For b,
this requires an additional invariant at d which will need measurements from the vertices
{b, d, f} to instantiate its required power flows. This brings f into the framework and
increases its total size to 6, and proves the minimum framework size is once again n.
Once again extend the network to n = 7 with vertex g in Figure 5.2. It still
follows from above that {a, b, c, d, e, f} belong to the framework. However, c is also a
neighbor of a that must be adjacent to a second invariant. The only option for this
second invariant is e, which would require measurements from the vertices in the set
{c, e, g}. As g is not yet in the framework, this increases the total framework size to 7
and shows once again the minimum framework size is n.
This has proved that, in order to satisfy Theorem 2, the attestation frameworks
for all ring networks with sizes in the range 5 ≤ n ≤ 7 must be of size n. However, it has
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not shown that attestation is possible in these networks as it was never demonstrated
that Theorem 1 holds for these topologies. The method to prove Theorem 1 would be to
do an exhaustive proof that there is no pair wise combination of vertices for which the
condition ∀x, y ∈ V,N(y)− {x} 6= N(x)− {y} is violated like for the cases with n ≤ 4.
This result is obvious because for any selection of two vertices x and y, there always
exists a vertex z that is adjacent to either x or y but not both. Due to the mundane
nature of this proof, the truth of Theorem 1 is claimed for these three cases without
proof.
Theorem 6. All ring networks with size n ≥ 8 have minimum attestation frameworks
of size 7.
Proof. Figure 5.3 shows a ring network of size n > 7. In the same vein as the previous
proof, it will be shown that the minimum size attestation framework for the target a in









Figure 5.3: Arbitrary Size Ring Topologies
There must be an invariant at a to satisfy the first requirement of Theorem 2.
There must also be invariants at both b and c to satisfy the second requirement that
at least two neighbors of the target a are invariants. For the third requirement of
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Theorem 2, both d and e must also be invariants. The selection of invariants so far follows
the same reasoning as the previous proof, and is both sufficient and necessary (due to
the limited degree of vertices in ring networks) to fulfill the first three requirements of
Theorem 2. The final requirement states that no vertex in the graph can be adjacent
to the same set of invariants as the target a. This set is the invariants at both b and c.
This final requirement is satisfied since no vertex besides a is adjacent to both b and c.
This is obvious through examination of Figure 5.3. Thus, all of the requirements have
been satisfied with the set of invariants µS({a, b, c, d, e}).
The minimum size framework must be able to calculate these five invariants using
Equation 3.1. To do this, it is necessary to calculate the power flows Pdf and Peg. These
power flows require measurements from vertices f and g respectively. The remaining
power flows can be computed from the existing set {a, b, c, d, e}. With this, the vertices
that must be included in the minimum size attestation framework are {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}
with a total size of 7.
This completes the analysis of physical attestation in ring networks of arbitrary
size. Table 5.1 summarizes the results of all of the proofs presented in this section with
respect to the minimum attestation framework sizes. The following section will use
similar analysis applied to different network topologies.
Table 5.1: Minimum attestation framework sizes for ring topologies
Ring Size (n) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Framework Size (f) ND1 ND ND 5 6 7 7
5.2. MESH NETWORKS
This section will consider the minimum size attestation framework for a mesh
network where each vertex has degree 4. An assumption is made for the sake of gen-
eralization that the n-by-m mesh network satisfies n ≥ 6 and m ≥ 6. Attestation is
1No framework can be formulated as the ring is nondeducible.
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possible in smaller networks, but these are special cases which must be considered on
an individual basis. In addition, the proof will limit itself to n-by-n mesh networks to
utilize graph homomorphism. It will then be argued that additional rows or columns
added to this mesh do not affect the size of the minimum framework.
The formulation of the minimum framework will follow in the same manner as
the ring network. An arbitrary vertex will be selected to be the target of attestation
and vertices will be added one at a time to satisfy all of the requirements of Theorem 3.
However, because mesh networks have a higher degree of connectivity, there are often
several ways to select vertices to fulfill these requirements. In these cases, multiple
frameworks will be constructed that consider each possible permutation of vertices. Due
to the regular structure of mesh networks, the actual number of permutations is quite
low. All the frameworks will then be compared to determine which has minimum size.
According to Theorem 3, an attestation framework requires at least two invariants
in µ(N(t)). Due to homomorphism within a square mesh, there are exactly two unique
ways to select these vertices. Either the two vertices appear on opposite sides of the
target as shown in Figure 5.4, or the two vertices form an L with the target located
at the joint as shown in Figure 5.5. These two variants will be referred to as the line
pattern and L pattern respectively. Because these two variants are the only ways to
satisfy the degree requirement needed for an attestation framework, the smaller of the
two variants will be the minimum size attestation framework for mesh networks.
Lemma 8. The line pattern results in an attestation framework with total size of 15.
Proof. Figure 5.6 illustrates each step of the following proof. The line pattern must begin
with the invariants in µS({t, 1, 2}). It is required for the first condition in Theorem 3,
while I1 and I2 are due to the definition of the line pattern. Another permutation of the
line pattern would be µ({t, a, b}), but this is a homomorphic case that will result in the
same framework size and can be ignored. The set µS({t, 1, 2}) also satisfies condition 4
from the theorem as, by inspection of Figure 5.6, there is no vertex in the graph save t
that is adjacent to both vertices 1 and 2. The third requirement is the last requirement
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t
Figure 5.4: Mesh Line Pattern
t
Figure 5.5: Mesh L Pattern
that must be satisfied in order to generate a valid attestation framework. A claim
is now made that vertices 3 and 4 belong to a minimum size attestation framework.
Under the assumption that this claim holds, then the total framework as shown in
Figure 5.6 contains µS({t, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and consists of 15 vertices. Recall that several
unlabeled vertices must be brought into the framework to satisfy the definition of µS().
If this is not the minimum framework for the line pattern, then it must be possible
to replace µS({3, 4}) with some other combination of invariants that results in fewer
vertices being added to the framework. Notice that it is impossible for condition 3
from Theorem 3 to be met with the addition of a single invariant, as vertices 1 and 2
have no neighbor in common other than the target t and must both be adjacent to a
second vertex with an associated invariant in µS(V ). Therefore, at least two invariants
must be selected for a valid framework. In addition, to be better than the 15 framework
described above, at least one of those invariants must add only a single new vertex to the
attestation framework. However, there exists no vertex in the graph adjacent to either
1 or 2 that would only increase the framework size by 1. Therefore, the 15 framework





Figure 5.6: 15 Vertex Framework for Line Pattern
Theorem 7. The minimum size attestation framework for an n-by-n mesh with n ≥ 6
has size 15.
Proof. Other than the line pattern covered in Lemma 8, the only other variant for
selection of the initial invariants is the L pattern. Figure 5.7 illustrates each step of the
following proof. µS({t}) must be included to satisfy the first requirement of Theorem 3.
Then the L pattern must be included to satisfy the second requirement, which brings in
invariants µS({1, 2}). In order to satisfy the fourth requirement, another invariant must
be added at a vertex that is adjacent to t or a. However, if either Ib or Ic is selected, then
the framework would contain the line pattern that was discussed in Lemma 8. Instead,
we must chose a new invariant at a vertex adjacent to a. Due to graph homomorphism,
the only choice for this invariant is I3. At this point, the current size of the framework
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Figure 5.7: 13 Vertex Framework for L Pattern
The last remaining requirement that must be fulfilled is the degree requirement
of the vertices adjacent to the target. Consider all the possibilities of invariants adjacent
the vertex labeled c in the current framework. All of these possibilities would increase the
framework size by at least 2, which would make the minimum framework size no smaller
than 15. However, Lemma 8 already describes a framework of size 15. Therefore, using
the L pattern, it is impossible to do better than the line pattern, and the line pattern
will always result in a minimum attestation framework.
Corollary 1. The minimum size attestation framework for an n-by-m mesh with n,m ≥
6 has size 15.
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Corollary 1 follows Theorem 7 through the observation that the minimum frame-
work shown in Figure 5.6 did not roll over the edge of the mesh network. Therefore, the
addition of rows or columns would not change the proof for Lemma 8 and it would still
be possible to generate a framework of size 15 in a rectangular mesh network.
5.3. HYPERCUBES
This section will formulate the minimize size attestation framework for an n-
dimensional hypercube. Because of the regular connectivity of a hypercube, construction
of this minimum framework can be done in polynomial time. The proof will use the
binary formulation of hypercubes where each vertex has an n-bit binary label and two
vertices are adjacent if their associated labels have a hamming distance of 1. A special
set notation will be used to simplify the discussion in which vertices will be placed into
sets based on the number of bits set in their label. These sets will be referred to as hi for
0 ≤ i ≤ n where i is the number of 1-bits in the label. Figure 5.8 shows an example of a
4-dimensional hypercube and the partition of its vertices into these sets. The minimum
attestation framework will be constructed using the single vertex in the set h0 as the
target of attestation. This result can then be generalized using an XOR operation to
construct the minimum framework for an arbitrary target node.
Lemma 9. Some minimum attestation framework for a hypercube uses three invariants
from µ(h1) to satisfy the second and fourth requirements from Theorem 3.
Proof. All attestation frameworks must contain two invariants from µ(N(t)) to satisfy
the second requirement from Theorem 3. In a hypercube, because the target belongs to
h0 and edges only exist between vertices with a hamming distance of 1, these invariants
must be located at vertices in h1. Given two arbitrary vertices in h1, there is exactly one
vertex in h2 adjacent to both. Unless additional invariants are added to the framework,
this h2 vertex violates the fourth requirement from Theorem 3. All frameworks must



















Figure 5.8: Example Hypercube
Assume that a minimum framework uses a vertex v ∈ h3 to prevent the violation.
This vertex will be adjacent to (n − 3) vertices from h4 since it contains (n − 3) 0-bits
in its label that could be changed into a 1. Until this point, no vertices from h4 have
been added to the framework, and we will now claim that the minimum framework
will contain no vertices from h4 except those (n− 3) needed to calculate the Iv invariant
being discussed now. Choosing v will therefore always increase the size of the framework
≥ (n− 3), with the potential for a larger value since additional vertices from h2 may be
needed to calculate Iv.
The proof for the claim that no vertices in h4 are required outside of this step
is derived from Theorem 3. Within the context of a hypercube, the first requirement
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selects invariants from µ(h0), while the second requirement selects invariants from µ(h1)
and the third requirement from µ(h2). This is consistent with the earlier discussion
of a two-hop distance being the worst case size for an attestation framework. These
invariants would bring vertices from h0 to h3 into the attestation framework. No other
invariants are required to satisfy Theorem 3 outside of the fourth requirement being
considered now, and so the claim that no vertices from h4 will be required outside of
this step holds.
Assume that instead of the h3 vertex, a minimum framework uses a vertex u ∈ h1
to prevent the violation of Theorem 3. The h1 vertex is adjacent to the one vertex in
h0 and (n− 1) vertices in h2. However, h0 must be in the framework in order to satisfy
the first requirement of Theorem 3. In addition, two arbitrary nodes have already been
selected from h1 in order to satisfy the second requirement. Each of these two vertices
shares one neighbor in common with u which has already been added to the framework.
This means that u would add ≤ (n− 3) new vertices to the framework.
Because the selection of another vertex from h1 is always at least as good as
selection of a vertex from h3, there must exist a minimum attestation framework that
selects the h1 vertex.
From the discussion thus far, we have concluded that some minimum framework
contains invariants at h0 and three vertices from h1. This framework satisfies the first,
second, and fourth requirements of Theorem 3 as discussed in the proof for Lemma 9.
The last requirement that must be satisfied is to ensure that each vertex in h1 is adjacent
to at least two vertices with associated invariants in µS(V ). As |µ(h0)| = 1, one of these
vertices must necessarily come from the set h2.
There are two strategies for selection of nodes in h2 to be invariants: the invariants
can be selected either to minimize the number of h2 vertices added into the framework,
or to minimize the number of h3 vertices. The first approach attempts to minimize
the total number of invariants by ensuring that each vertex that is used as an invariant
covers as many unique members of h1 as possible. In the binary notation for hypercubes,
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the optimal strategy for this approach would be to choose vertices whose labels share no
1-bits in common. For instance, in a 4-dimensional hypercube, selection of (0011) and
(1100) since the intersection of these labels is (0000). The second approach attempts to
maximize the number of shared neighbors between the vertices selected as invariants in
h3. The optimal strategy for this approach is to select vertices in h2 that share bits in
common. In the 4-dimensional hypercube, selection of (0011), (0101), and (1001) would
be an example of this approach since the intersection of these labels is (0001). As it can
be seen, these two approaches are incompatible with each other because one attempts
to minimize the overlap of 1-bits while the other attempts to maximize the overlap.
To determine the optimal selection of nodes from h2, the vertices from h2 are
assigned to sets when they are added to the framework. Each set contains the set of h2
nodes that share mutual neighbors in h1. Therefore, within a set, the intersection of the
labels of the set members will be a bit string that contains a single 1-bit. And across
sets, the intersection of any arbitrary label from each set will result in the bit string that
contains all 0-bits. In the two examples given above, the sets are S1 = {0011};S2 =
{1100} and S ′1 = {0011, 0101, 1001}. The first approach of minimizing the overlap of
1-bits would attempt to maximize the number of these sets, while the second approach
would attempt to minimize the number of sets.
Each set as defined above covers m+1 vertices of h1 where m is the set size. The
first member in the set covers 2 vertices in h1, and each subsequent member contributes
only 1 to the total coverage. We assume that if a vertex had covered 0 additional
elements, it would have been dropped rather than added to the set. Also note that the
coverage of each set is independent of each other. If two sets have overlap in h1 such
that their total coverage is not the sum of their individual coverage, then the two sets
could have been combined into one larger set that still satisfies the definition of sets
given above.
Each set has a cost equal to the number of new vertices it brings into the frame-
work. The framework already contains all of the vertices in h1 in order to calculate
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It, and so these neighbors add nothing to the cost. However, the framework contains
no vertices in h3. We now make the claim that if two vertices from h2 are placed into
different sets, then they share no neighbors in h3 in common. For two h2 nodes to have
a h3 neighbor in common, they must share at least one bit. However, if they share one
bit, then they must have been placed into the same set by the set definitions. This
contradiction proves the claim.
The cost of each set can now be determined in the number of unique nodes from
h3 brought into the framework. The first vertex added to the set is adjacent to (n− 2)
vertices from h3 and adds (n − 2) to the total cost. In order to minimize the total
cost, each subsequent vertex should share 1-bit in common with each member of the
set. Then the cost to bring in the (k)th vertex would be (n − 1 − k) as it would share
one neighbor with each of the (k − 1) set members before it. It is possible that a set
does not satisfy this property, and each subsequent vertex shares a 1-bit with only some
subset of the set members. In this case, the entire set can be replaced with a different
set that has the same coverage and the cost described above. However, the total cost
also must consider the additional vertices brought in from h2. We now assume that no
vertices from h2 belong to the framework. This is a false assumption, as several vertices
from h2 are already in the framework to evaluate a subset of µ(h1). However, this
assumption simplifies the next part of the discussion and can be removed later. Under
this assumption, each vertex would add (n − k) cost due to the additional cost of 1 to
add itself, and the total cost of the set then generalizes to Σm1 (n− i).
Lemma 10. Given k arbitrary sets with sizes {m1,m2, . . . ,mk} where Σk1(mi + 1) = n,
it is always possible to generate a single set of size (n−1) that has the same set coverage
at lower total cost.
Proof. According to the cost formula, a set of size m has a cost of Σm1 (n − i). This
summation simplifies to m(2n−m−1)
2
. The cost formula for the two sets are Σki=1Σ
mi
j=1(n−j)
and Σn−1i=1 (n − i) respectively. Lemma 10 is equivalent to the mathematical inequality
Σki=1Σ
mi
j=1(n−j) ≥ Σn−1i=1 (n−i). Assume instead that Σki=1Σmij=1(n−j) < Σn−1i=1 (n−i). After
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several simplifications, this inequality reduces to the form 2m1m2 + . . . + 2mk−1mk <





terms on the left side of this inequality. Because
mi is the size of a non-empty set, it holds that ∀i,mi ≥ 1. From this, it always follows
that 2mimj ≥ 2. Because there are k(k−1)2 of these terms, the entire left side of the
inequality must be ≥ 2k(k−1)
2
= k(k − 1) = k2 − k. This gives the contradiction that
completes the proof.
Corollary 2. The optimal strategy for selection of invariants in h2 is to minimize the
number of sets and maximize the overlap of 1-bits between the selected invariants.
Proof. Lemma 10 leads to this result. Because a combined set has a cost no more than
multiple disjoint sets, it follows that there exists a minimum attestation framework in
which all the invariants from h2 belong to a single set according to the set definitions.
Corollary 2 is not the intuitive result as the optimal solution is not to minimize
the number of invariants. This result is part of the reason why the minimum attestation
framework is an NP-Complete problem. Instead, the optimal solution is to select a single
vertex v ∈ h1 and use the invariants µ(N(v) ∩ h2). This gives the final piece required
for the minimum attestation framework for hypercubes.
Theorem 8. The minimum size attestation framework for an n-dimensional hypercube
contains (n2 + 5n− 8)/2 vertices.
Proof. The attestation framework includes invariants at h0, three nodes of h1 according
to Lemma 9, and (k − 1) nodes of h2 according to Corollary 2. The nodes in h2 require
a total cost of Σ
(n−1)
1 (n − i) = 0.5n(n − 1) in terms of h2 and h3 nodes. There are
an additional (n + 1) nodes that must be included from h0 and h1 to evaluate the
invariant located at the target. One of the h1 invariants can be evaluated at no extra
cost by choosing it to be the one bit all the h2 invariants share in common. The second
h1 invariant can only overlap with one of the h2 invariants and thus requires (n − 2)
additional nodes. Likewise, the third h2 invariant will overlap with one h2 invariant and
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one neighbor of the second invariant for (n − 3) nodes. The total cost thus becomes




The Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM)
Systems Center is a National Science Foundation funded Engineering Research Center
working on the development of an internet for energy [42]. FREEDM has developed
simulations of smart distribution networks and a distributed intelligence capable of per-
forming power migrations within the simulation environment. Physical attestation was
integrated with the FREEDM system to produce experimental results that support the
theoretical results from prior sections. This section provides a brief overview of the
implementation details and the experimental results obtained from the smart grid test
bed.
6.1. DISTRIBUTED GRID INTELLIGENCE
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Laboratory at Missouri University of Sci-
ence and Technology has developed the Distributed Grid Intelligence (DGI) to control
smart electronics in FREEDM [43]. The DGI provides several services that can be uti-
lized by developers to write distributed algorithms for use in the smart grid. Figure 6.1
shows the main services offered by the DGI.
A Solid State Transformer (SST) is a special piece of hardware developed by the
FREEDM Systems Center that enables power resources at a bus to be controlled by the
DGI. Within the context of the smart grid model, the SST can be thought of as one of the
houses or buses in the distribution grid. Each SST is controlled by a separate instance
of the DGI, and the DGI instances communicate with each other using UDP over some
network. A service called group management maintains the communication channels
between multiple instances of the DGI. The DGI has additional services for collecting
the physical state of its attached power electronics, and storing a virtual representation
of the physical smart grid topology.
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Figure 6.1: Distributed Grid Intelligence Architecture
The most important DGI service for physical attestation is the load balance
algorithm that performs power migrations between DGI instances. Each DGI monitors
the state of its SST using a device interface which connects to either real or simulated
power electronics. It then determines whether it is in the demand or supply state based
on its amount of local generation and load. A DGI in the supply state will attempt
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to form a power migration contract with another DGI in the demand state. These
migrations follow the protocol described in the smart grid model introduced in Section 1.
Another DGI service important for physical attestation is device management
which handles the physical measurements received from the power electronics. The
DGI supports real time measurements from all of the devices attached to its associated
SST. As part of the implementation of physical attestation, this service was extended
to store historic measurement data during runtime. The historic data is stored with
a time stamp that uses the current simulation time of the power simulation. Because
all of the DGI instances communicate with the same power simulation, the simulation
time acts as a synchronized clock value for the DGI. In a real physical deployment, the
simulation time would have to be replaced with an alternate synchronized clock value.
Synchronized time is important to ensure that the historic data stored across multiple
DGI instances corresponds to a consistent state of the physical system.
The DGI is a real time system, and the various services such as load balance
are assigned time slots in a round robin schedule. An example schedule for the DGI
is shown in Figure 6.2. One consequence of this schedule is that the different services
cannot operate outside of their assigned time slots. All messages that are sent to a
particular service outside of its time slot will be delayed until the next time that service
is allocated to run. As a result, load balance cannot react immediately to messages from
physical attestation when the behavior of a specific target is verified. This delay will

















One Round of Computation
Figure 6.2: Round Robin Schedule
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6.2. PHYSICAL ATTESTATION ARCHITECTURE
Physical attestation as a security mechanism determines whether a process in
a distribution grid has provided false measurements to some verifier. In the context
of power migrations, physical attestation can be used to determine whether a target
process has committed to a power migration by making a change to generation or load.
If physical attestation fails, it indicates that the power migration has failed and the
party in a migration contract with the target should undo their physical action. This
leads to a natural situation where both parties in a migration contract will perform
physical attestation against each other to verify the physical activity of the other process.
Although there are other applications of physical attestation, the following discussion
will focus how a supply process in a power migration would use attestation to protect
against itself a potential fake demand attack.
Figure 6.3 shows an overview of how physical attestation has been integrated
with the DGI. First, a DGI instance must decide to perform attestation on one of its
peers. To prevent the fake demand attack, the supply house will serve as the verifier
and perform attestation on each demand house it selects for power migrations. Then
the supply house must build a valid attestation framework and collect Pˆi, Vˆi, and δˆi
values from all the framework members. These values will be used to compute a subset
of the conservation of power invariants to determine the invariant violation pattern.
From the violation pattern, the supply house will determine if the demand house it
formed a migration contract with is malicious. If the demand house fails attestation,
then the supply house must undo its change in generation to back out of the failed power
migration.
Physical attestation determines if a process has lied about its physical state at a
specific point in time. However, power migrations involve a change in power over time,
and thus physical attestation must be performed both before and after the migration
was scheduled. A supply house must abort a power migration if its demand partner
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Figure 6.3: Physical Attestation in the Distributed Grid Intelligence
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points does not correspond to the negotiated migration amount. Algorithm 1 shows
how a supply process will call attestation to determine if it should abort a migration
due to the existence of a fake demand attack. This algorithm takes as an input the
identifier of a target process t, the time at which the migration with the target should
have occurred, and the real power change ∆P negotiated for the migration. A constant
 error term is allowed to account for measurement error, and the expected time τ to
finish a migration is used to determine when the change should manifest in the physical
system. If the algorithm returns false, then either physical attestation reported that the
target process has lied or the target did not migrate ∆P units of power at the specified
time. A supply process can use the return value of this function to determine whether
it needs to undo its change to generation to abort the power migration.
Algorithm 1: Verification of a Power Migration
Data: A target process t expected to participate in a power migration
Data: The time when the migration contract was created
Data: The real power change ∆P expected from the target
Result: A flag to indicate whether the target performed the migration
1 {pass0, P0} ← PhysicalAttestation(t, time)
2 while CurrentT ime < time+ τ do
3 wait
4 {passτ , Pτ} ← PhysicalAttestation(t, time+ τ)
5 return pass0 ∧ passτ ∧ |Pτ − P0 −∆P | < 
Algorithm 2 defines the function that performs physical attestation. Line 1 uses
a modified breadth-first search algorithm that does not explore past a specified depth,
and this generates the 4-hop attestation framework described in Theorem 4. Line 2
checks the framework against the conditions of Theorem 3 to ensure that the framework
contains no nondeducible cases for the target t. Line 3 then queries all processes in the
framework for their Pˆi, Vˆi, and δˆi values at the given attestation time. These values
are fed into an invariant calculation performed on Line 4, and the attestation result is
reported back on Line 5.
Algorithm 3 shows the implementation of the check violation pattern function.
First the algorithm classifies the framework invariants µS(V ) into two sets based on
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Algorithm 2: Physical Attestation
Data: The target process t for attestation
Data: The time when attestation should be performed
Result: A flag to indicate whether the target passed attestation
Result: The real power Pˆt reported by the target during attestation
1 S ← BreadthF irstSearch(t, 4)
2 pass← V alidateFramework(S, t)
3 data← CollectMeasurements(S, time)
4 pass← pass ∧ ¬CheckV iolationPattern(S, t, data)
5 return {pass, data.t.P}
whether or not the invariants are located at vertices adjacent to the target t. The first
set Iadjacent = µS(N(t)) contains the invariants adjacent to the target, and the second
set Iother = µS(S − N(t) − {t}) contains the remaining framework invariants with the
exception of It. Then the algorithm counts the number of violated invariants in both
sets, and determines whether It itself has been violated. This information is used to
determine if the violation pattern corresponds to a malicious target t.
In Algorithm 3, the CalculateInvariant(i, data) function is implemented as the
conservation of power invariant |ΣN(i)j Pij − Pˆi| < . The Pij calculation is performed
according to the real power flow for a distribution line described in Equation 3.2. How-
ever, the power simulation contains three-phase distribution lines, and so Equation 3.2
was computed once for each phase and the results were summed together to get the
three-phase power flow.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 3 returns true if and only if the target t of physical attestation
provides false data to the attestation algorithm.
Sufficient Proof. The key to this theorem is the observation that Iadjacent = µS(N(t)) and
Iother = µS(S −N(t)− {t}). Suppose the target t provides false data to the attestation
algorithm. According to Table 3.1, this causes an invariant violation pattern of either
µS({t}), µS(N(t)), or µS(N(t) ∪ {t}). For all three violation patterns, the invariants
located at vertices in S −N(t)− {t} are true. Therefore, all of the invariants in the set
Iother are satisfied and otherV iolated = 0.
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Algorithm 3: Invariant Violation Pattern Calculation
Data: The attestation framework S
Data: The target process t for attestation
Data: A set of data containing P , V , and δ values
Result: A boolean to indicate if the violation pattern matches the target
1 Iadjacent ← ∅, Iother ← ∅
2 foreach v ∈ S − {t} do
3 if {v} ∪N(v) ⊆ S then
4 if v ∈ N(t) then
5 Iadjacent ← Iadjacent ∪ {v}
6 else
7 Iother ← Iother ∪ {v}
8 adjacentV iolated← 0
9 foreach i ∈ Iadjacent do
10 if CalculateInvariant(i, data) = false then
11 adjacentV iolated← adjacentV iolated+ 1
12 otherV iolated← 0
13 foreach i ∈ Iother do
14 if CalculateInvariant(i, data) = false then
15 otherV iolated← otherV iolated+ 1
16 targetV iolated← ¬CalculateInvariant(t, data)
17 if targetV iolated ∧ adjacentV iolated+ otherV iolated = 0 then
18 return true




If the violation pattern is µS({t}) = It, then the algorithm will compute that
targetV iolated = true. In addition, the invariants in the set Iadjacent must be satisfied
which leads to adjacentV iolated = 0. It follows from substitution that adjacentV iolated+
otherV iolated = 0. This causes Line 17 to evaluate to true, and the algorithm returns
true.
If the violation pattern is µS(N(t)) or µS(N(t) ∪ {t}), then all the invariants in
the set Iadjacent will be violated and the algorithm will compute adjacentV iolated =
|Iadjacent|. Regardless of the value for targetV iolated, Line 19 adjacentV iolated =
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|Iadjacent| ∧ otherV iolated = 0 will evaluate to true. This causes the algorithm to return
true, and proves that all false data provided by the target leads to a return value of
true.
Necessary Proof. If Algorithm 3 returns true, then either Line 17 or Line 19 must evalu-
ate to true. Suppose targetV iolated∧adjacentV iolated+ otherV iolated = 0 is the true
clause, then by the formation of both adjacentV iolated and otherV iolated it follows
that all of the invariants in Iadjacent and Iother are satisfied. This leads to there being
no invariant violations in the set µS(N(t)) ∪ µS(S − N(t) − {t}) = µS(S − {t}). The
remaining invariant It must be false due to the value of the targetV iolated variable. The
invariant violation pattern would then be µS({t}), which is consistent with the target
having provided the false data.
Suppose the second clause adjacentV iolated = |Iadjacent| ∧ otherV iolated = 0
is true instead. Then all the invariants in µS(N(t)) must be violated, and none of the
invariants in µS(S−N(t)−{t}) can be violated. The remaining invariant It can be either
true or false without affecting the truth value of the clause. This leads to the invariant
violation pattern of either µS(N(t)) or µS(N(t)∪{t}), both of which are consistent with
the target providing the false data.
The implementation of attestation described so far detects dishonest behavior
from the target due to Theorem 9. However, the existence of a small  term to account
for measurement error allows processes to be dishonest within some small tolerance. As
such, a process could still shave small amounts of power off of its migrations without
being detected by Algorithm 1. In addition, the τ term for the time it takes the system to
complete a power migration introduces a small delay to the load balance algorithm. All
power migrations must be separated by at least τ units of time, as otherwise attestation
will result in false positives when multiple migrations happen within one time period.
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6.3. SMART GRID TEST BED
The Center for Advanced Power Systems (CAPS) at Florida State University
manages a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation test bed for the smart grid [44]. A
HIL simulation allows for integration of multiple DGI instances with a real time power
simulation to control the simulated power electronics. Figure 6.4 shows a high level
overview of the test bed architecture.
Figure 6.4: Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation Architecture
The test bed contains six Mamba boards and one field-programmable gate array
(FPGA) connected via Ethernet to a local area network. DGI instances are deployed
across the six Mamba boards, with up to four simultaneous DGI instances per board.
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The DGI communicate with each other using UDP through the wired internal network,
and with the power simulation using a TCP connection to the FPGA. The FPGA
maintains a separate TCP socket for each DGI instance, and acts as a multiplexer
that pushes the DGI’s commands to the power simulation. Metered values from the
simulation also go through the FPGA where they are sent to the DGI instance that
requires that specific state information.
A power simulation is compiled and run on a real time digital simulator (RTDS).
The values sent to and received from the FPGA must be specified before at compile time.
An additional Windows desktop computer not shown in the architecture is connected to
the RTDS to monitor its runtime. Through this Windows machine, parameters of the
simulation can be monitored and changed while the simulation is running.
During a typical simulation, the RTDS will start in a steady state where the
DGI is idle. A command will be issued through the Windows machine to perturb the
power system and cause a reaction in the DGI. The simulation will be left alone until
the power system enters its next steady state, and the resulting graph will be used for
the experimental results. In the case of the load balance algorithm, the command that
will be issued to the simulation is a change in the generation and load at specific buses.
The physical topology used on the test bed is shown in Figure 6.5. The seven
numbered buses model SSTs rated at 285 kVA that can be configured to act as either
generators or loads. An eighth bus labeled BusS has no local generation and load and
acts as the connection point for one of the two diesel generators in the system. Both
diesel generators G1 and G2 are rated at 1.4 MVA, 380 VL−N , with G1 operating in
isochronous mode and G2 operating in droop mode. G2 runs at 400 kW nominal with
a 5% droop. The generators are connected to the system by a transformers rated at 1.5
MVA, 0.83 kV:12.47 kV. All the distribution lines connecting the buses are identical,













Figure 6.5: Simulated Distribution Grid Topology
6.4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
One limitation of the DGI load balance algorithm is that it does not work well
when attached to both fixed and controllable sources of generation. For instance, SST4
contains both its local renewable generation as well as the droop generator G2 which
produces a constant 400 kW. If the DGI instance at this SST participated in the load
balance algorithm, it would attempt to migrate power from the droop generator despite
its need to remain constant. SST4 therefore must be split into two buses controlled
by different DGI instances to separate the droop generator from the renewable genera-
tion. Both DGI will read identical state values from the power simulation, but consider
themselves to be on separate buses connected by a 0 impedance distribution line.
An additional hardware limitation is that the FPGA can only transfer 64 data
points out of the simulation. However, the simulation requires 9 DGI instances and
each instance requires 8 data points. It would be impossible to run the simulation with
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instances of DGI associated with all of the buses using the current test bed hardware.
Therefore, only 7 DGI instances were run on 7 sequential buses in the power system.
This allows for the center DGI instance to be a valid attestation target as shown in the
7-node framework from Section 3.
Table 6.1 shows the configuration of the buses for all of the experimental results
discussed in this section. Buses 6 and 7, which do not have associated DGI instances
due to the hardware limitation discussed above, were set to produce a fixed 250 kW of
load. This ensures that there is always sufficient load in the system to allow the droop
generation to run at its rated value of 400 kW. Bus 3 acts as the demand house for
power migrations and will increase its load from 0 to 285 kW during the simulation
runtime. Bus 2 acts as both the supply house and the verifier that will perform physical
attestation.
Table 6.1: Experimental Bus Configuration
Bus ID DGI Instance Generation Load
S mamba1:51870 100 kW 0
1 mamba2:51870 0 0
2 mamba3:51870 0→ 285 kW 0
3 mamba4:51870 0 0→ 285 kW
4a mamba5:51870 0 0
4b mamba6:51870 400 kW 0
5 mamba1:51871 0 0
6 none 0 250 kW
7 none 0 250 kW
Figure 6.6 shows the normal behavior of the load balance algorithm in the absence
of a fake demand attack. Buses 2 and 3 both start with initial real power injections of
0 before performing a series of power migrations with each other. A power migration
leads to coordinated power steps with identical magnitudes in opposite directions.
Bus 3 was then set to perform the fake demand attack and physical attestation
was disabled. Figure 6.7 shows the impact of an undetected fake demand attack. Buses
2 and 3 form migration contracts as before, and Bus 2 ramps up its generation to fulfill
its portion of the power migration. However, Bus 3 fails to perform its increase in load
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Figure 6.6: Normal Power Migration
and keeps its real power injection at a constant value of 0. This leads to excess gener-
ation being pushed into the distribution grid that must be handled by the isochronous
generator G1.
Figure 6.8 shows the same case of the fake demand attack but performed when
physical attestation is enabled. The round robin schedule of DGI causes short bursts of
power migrations which step the power value up to the final amount of 285 kW. The other
DGI algorithms are given time to run only after the time scheduled for load balance.
Physical attestation executes during this load balance idle period and determines that a
number of invalid power migrations have occurred. The attestation failure messages will
not be received by load balance until it is scheduled to run again in its next iteration.
This causes load balance to undo all the power migrations from the previous iteration,
and Bus 2 resets its real power injection to 0. The jump from 285 kW to 0 demonstrates
that physical attestation has worked, as the load balance algorithm has reset its power
injection in response to notifications from attestation of bad power transactions.
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Figure 6.7: Fake Demand Attack
Figure 6.8: Physical Attestation
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After Bus 2 resets its real power injection as a result of attestation failure, it still
has an excess of 285 kW of transferable power. It therefore tries again to migrate its
power to another entity in the system. However, the only load in the system with an
attached DGI is the malicious Bus 3. As a result, Bus 2 always tries to migrate power
with the malicious bus which causes the repeated behavior of power steps and resets
in Figure 6.8. Load balance would have to be augmented with an additional security
scheme such as a reputation system based on number of failed transactions in order to
prevent this looping behavior.
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7. CONCLUSION
This dissertation introduced a new distributed security mechanism called physical
attestation for the smart grid. The theoretical foundation for physical attestation was
proved for general graphs using graph theory and nondeducibility. A smart grid test bed
was then utilized to produce experimental results that demonstrate the theory holds in
practice. This section discusses the main contributions of this dissertation, and proposes
several future research directions.
7.1. CONTRIBUTIONS
When physical attestation was proposed as a research topic, three goals were set
for this dissertation. This section enumerates those goals, and describes the contributions
this dissertation has made towards each of them. The following discussion describes how
the three research goals listed below have been achieved.
1. Extend physical attestation to multiple cyber-physical system topologies
2. Develop an attestation framework applicable to multiple attack scenarios
3. Implement the theoretical results on a simulated cyber-physical system
7.1.1. Multiple System Topologies. The first research goal was to determine
whether physical attestation could be applicable to multiple physical topologies. The-
orem 2 enumerates the topological features that are both necessary and sufficient to
apply physical attestation in general graphs. In order for this result to be useful in a
distributed system with thousands of processes, Theorem 3 introduces the notion of an
attestation framework that uses a subset of the system state. Finding the minimum
size attestation framework for a general graph was proven to be NP-Hard in Theorem 5.
Section 5 then went on to find polynomial-time solutions for ring, mesh, and hypercube
topologies of arbitrary sizes.
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7.1.2. General Attestation Framework. The second research goal was to
formulate a general attestation implementation that works for multiple attack scenarios.
Theorem 4 describes a polynomial time algorithm to generate attestation frameworks
for general graphs that uses all vertices within four-hops of the attestation target. Algo-
rithm 1 uses this framework to implement physical attestation in an energy management
algorithm for the smart grid. The attack scenario considered in the experimental results
was a fake demand attack in which a controller falsifies its broadcast load to trick sup-
pliers into committing to bad power migrations. However, Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and
Lemma 3 which form the backbone of this entire dissertation considered all possible
false state attacks against the energy management algorithm. Therefore, Algorithm 1
can be used to protect the energy management algorithm against all possible false state
attacks that involve a single compromised controller.
7.1.3. Experimental Implementation. The third research goal was to inte-
grate physical attestation with an energy management algorithm and experiment on
a simulated cyber-physical system. A smart grid test bed at the FREEDM Systems
Center was utilized to perform the experiments. Figure 6.3 provides an overview of the
physical attestation implementation. Figure 6.8 presents the main experimental result
that demonstrates the feasibility of physical attestation. All of the code for the physical
attestation implementation can be found on the DGI development github [45].
7.1.4. Refereed Publications. This dissertation reflects the following peer-
reviewed publications:
1. 7th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security [46]
2. 8th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security [47]
3. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing [48]
[46] used nondeducibility to examine a series of false state attacks performed
against energy management in the smart grid. Physical attestation as a security mech-
anism to detect and prevent these attacks was then introduced in [47]. The theoretical
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proofs and experimental results that support physical attestation were then provided
in [48].
7.2. FUTURE WORK
Physical attestation, even restricted to the single application of preventing false
state attacks against energy management in the smart grid, is a large research area
with many potential future research directions. Several of the deficient areas of this
dissertation, as well as other exciting research directions, are enumerated in the following
discussion.
7.2.1. Theoretical Extensions. The idea of physical attestation is to use
physical feedback in a distributed cyber-physical system to detect malicious cyber behav-
ior. This dissertation restricted itself to a single application that utilized the conservation
of power in the smart grid to detect false state attacks against energy management. It is
easy to imagine other applications of physical application that handle different forms of
cyber misbehavior in different types of cyber-physical systems. With respect to different
system types, the most immediate extension would be water distribution systems as the
dynamics of water flow are similar to electric power flow. However, it should be possible
to extend the main body of this dissertation to apply to most flow-based cyber-physical
systems which move a commodity through some physical medium.
A more interesting research direction would be to consider how using different
forms of physical feedback affects the deducibility of attacks. This dissertation chose
the conservation of power as a physical invariant, and that choice determined the in-
variant violation patterns of the false state attack. However, other work in literature
has considered a similar approach using Kirchhoff’s voltage law to promising effect [49].
A different choice of physical invariant would change all of the invariant violation pat-
terns and could lead to less nondeducible attack scenarios. One extension of this work
would be to consider alternative invariants and the impact of invariant choice on attack
deducibility.
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7.2.2. Attestation Frameworks. The attestation framework presented in this
dissertation can tolerate falsified states from a single compromised controller. Although
the theory allows for multiple processes to be compromised so long as they participate
in different attestation frameworks, physical attestation cannot tolerate collaborative
attacks in the same framework. An easy extension of attestation frameworks would
be to develop a framework that can tolerate multiple compromised controllers and still
verify the attestation target.
The main limitation of attestation frameworks is that the problem of finding a
minimum size framework in a general graph is NP-Hard. A significant future extension
could develop approximation algorithms that generate good enough attestation frame-
works for general graphs. Complexity analysis of these approximation algorithms in
terms of both time complexity and framework size would be a worthwhile extension of
this research.
7.2.3. Additional Experimentation. One unfortunate limitation during this
dissertation was that the smart grid test bed was unable to support large power sim-
ulations. Experiments using a standard IEEE power system would greatly strengthen
the physical attestation experimental results. Finding optimal frameworks in standard
IEEE topologies could also generate a lot of insight into how attestation frameworks are
formed.
One feature of the test bed that this dissertation was unable to explore was re-
configuration of both the physical topology and the communication network. Physical
attestation requires measurements from a historic state of the system, and an interesting
scenario would be attestation in the presence of either physical or network reconfigura-
tions. There would also be significant merit in a more thorough integration of physical
attestation with the DGI that enables attestation to be used by services other than load
balance. The current implementation could be extended to be integrated with other
distributed smart grid algorithms that utilize real power injection.
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7.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The primary motivation of this research was the development of a distributed
cyber security mechanism that utilizes physical feedback. Cyber-physical systems have
the potential to cause drastic changes to existing cyber security mechanisms due to the
existence of a physical layer. A research area that must be explored is how this physical
layer both helps and hinders cyber security. This dissertation presented the idea of
physical attestation in which cyber misbehavior is verified against the physical system.
The main contribution of this work is that it serves as a case study that illustrates how
physical feedback might be used to augment a distributed security mechanism.
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